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The Tax Benefit Rule as Applied
to Corporate Liquidations and
Contributions to Capital: Recent Developments
EricJ. Byrne*
I. Introduction
Under the tax benefit rule a taxpayer who recovers an amount deducted in
a prior year must report that amount as income in the year of recovery to the
extent the prior deduction resulted in a tax benefit.' Two recent cases con-
stitute important developments in the application of this rule. In Tennessee-
Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Commissioner,2 the Sixth Circuit, affirming the
Tax Court, extended the tax benefit rule to liquidating distributions of
previously expensed assets. A central question in that case was whether a cor-
poration has "recovered" anything when it simply distributes an asset in liq-
uidation. In Putoma Corp. v. Commissioner,3 the Fifth Circuit, affirming the Tax
Court, declined to apply the tax benefit rule to a corporation which had been
forgiven interest indebtedness by its shareholders after the corporation had
deducted that interest as an accrual basis taxpayer in an earlier year. The court
held that the tax benefit rule was overruled by sections 102 and 118 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code (the Code), 4 which grant income nonrecognition to gifts
and contributions to capital respectively.
This article takes the position that Tennessee-Carolina represents a proper
extension of the tax benefit rule, while Putoma represents a backward step in-
consistent with the development of the rule in the corporate liquidation area.
The article discusses, first, the rule's application in the corporate liquidation
area, and second, the rule's application in the contribution to capital area.
II. Corporate Liquidations and the Tax Benefit Rule
Under Code sections 336 and 337, a liquidating corporation generally
does not recognize gain or loss if it either sells its assets or distributes them to its
shareholders. Section 336 provides that, except for the disposition of LIFO5 in-
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. B.A., St. Joseph's College, 1957; LL.B., St.
John's University, 1962; LL.M., New York University, 1972. Member of the New York bar.
I Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399, 401-02 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Estate of Munter
v. Commissioner 63 T.C. 663, 671 (1975).
2 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978), aff'g 65 T.C. 440 (1975), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979).
3 601 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'g 66 T.C. 652 (1976).
4 All statutory references, unless otherwise indicated, are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
5 LIFO ("last-in, first-out") is a method for identifying the closing inventory at cost. Under I.R.C.
§ 472 a taxpayer may elect to use this method subject to approval of the Commissioner. Using LIFO, a tax-
payer may treat the inventory at the close of the taxable year as consisting of first, those goods included in
the opening inventory of the taxable year and second, those goods acquired during the year.
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ventory and certain installment obligations under section 453,6 a corporation
recognizes no gain or loss on the distribution of property in partial or complete
liquidation. Section 336 was enacted as part of the 1954 Code and merely
reflects the prior common law that a corporation cannot be deemed to realize a
gain or loss on the mere distribution of an asset.'
Section 337 provides that if a corporation distributes all of its assets less
assets retained to meet claims, in complete liquidation within twelve months
following adoption of a plan of complete liquidation, the corporation shall
recognize no gain or loss from the sale or exchange of its property within that
twelve month period. Section 337(b) excludes from the .definition of
"property," and thus from the nonrecognition rule, sales of inventory other
than bulk transfers and certain installment obligations. Like section 336, sec-
tion 337(f) contains an exception for LIFO inventory. Unlike section 336, sec-
tion 337 in no way reflected prior law. Before 1954, a corporation holding ap-
preciated assets could liquidate in two ways. The corporation could sell its
assets to a third party, distribute the proceeds to its shareholders, and be taxed
on the gain realized from the sale. Alternatively, it could distribute the assets to
the shareholders and escape taxation. However, depending on the formalities
employed, a subsequent sale of distributed assets by shareholders could be at-
tributed back to the corporation and the corporation would not escape taxa-
tion.8 Section 337 was enacted to avoid these formalistic distinctions and
eliminate uncertainty. 9
Thus, since 1954, there is generally only one taxable event involved in a
distributing of liquidation assets. A corporation will generally escape tax on the
appreciation of its distributed liquidation assets under either section 336 or sec-
tion 337. However, the shareholders will generally be taxed on the difference
between their basis in the stock and either the cash or the fair market value of
the assets distributed to them in liquidation. 10
Despite the literal applicability of the nonrecognition rules of sections 336
or 337 to a transaction, in two general areas courts have forced corporations to
6 Section 453 provides that income from the sale of property on the installment basis may be reported
as the payments are received. Its purpose is to permit the spreading of income tax on the sale over the period
of installment payments, rather than recognizing the full taxable gain before the full selling price has been
received.
7 See S. REp. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 258 (1954); Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-20 (1944); Gould
v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 824, 829 (1930).
I.R.C. § 311, which also came into being with the 1954 Code, provides that a corporation generally
does not recognize gain or loss on the nonliquidating distribution of an asset. Section 311 like § 336 reflects
prior common law. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1954); General Util's & Operating
Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200, 206 (1935).
8 See United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co. 338 U.S. 451 (1950); Commissioner v. Court
Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
9 See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. a106 (1954); Central Tablet Mfg. Co. v. United
States, 417 U.S. 673, 682, 691 (1974). According to the doctrine of "anticipatory assignment of income,"
one who earns or otherwise creates the right to receive income will be taxed on that income even though he
assigns the right to receive it to another before realizing the income. The underlying policy of the doctrine is
to tax the assignor enjoying the benefit of the economic gain represented by his right to receive the income.
If a parent corporation possesses at least 80% of the combined voting power of all classes of a sub-
sidiary's stock entitled to vote, and also owns at least 80 % of the total number of shares of all other classes of
the subsidiary's stock (except nonvoting stock which is limited and preferred as to dividends) then that sub-
sidiary is referred to as an "eighty percent or greater subsidiary."
10 I.R.C. §§ 331, 1001(a)-(b). But see the nonrecognition rules for shareholders in certain elective one-
month liquidations under § 333 and the nonrecognition rules for a parent corporation in the liquidation of
an 80 percent or greater subsidiary under § 332.
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recognize income in the course of liquidation under broad principles outside
those sections. The first general area involves the distribution or sale by a cor-
poration of rights to income. In such situations the courts have utilized two
weapons in forcing recognition of income: the judicially created anticipatory
assignment of income doctrine,1 1 and the authority granted the Commissioner
under section 446(b) to change a taxpayer's accounting method when the ex-
isting method does not clearly reflect income. 12
The second general area involves application of the tax benefit rule. The
rule is of judicial origin but has received indirect ratification in section 111,
which deals with the exclusionary aspect of the rule. 13 Section 111, originally
enacted in 1942,14 provides that gross income does not include income at-
tributable to the recovery during the taxable year of a bad debt, prior tax or
delinquency amount to the extent that these items did not result in a reduction
of the taxpayer's tax. Section 111 was enacted to reverse judicial decisions
holding that recovery of a previously deducted amount resulted in income
despite the lack of a tax benefit to the taxpayer by reason of the deduction. 15
Although the statute only specifies bad debts, prior taxes and delinquency
amounts, the Supreme Court of the United States took a much broader view of
the exclusionary aspect of the rule in Dobson v. Commissioner. 16 Accordingly, the
Regulations under section 111 provide that the rule of exclusion in the statute
"applies equally with respect to all other losses, expenditures and accruals
")17
In addition to these broad overriding principles compelling recognition,
code sections 1245 and 1250 employ the tax benefit rule to override sections 336
and 337 in the case of depreciation deductions. Prior to the enactment of sec-
tions 1245 and 1250,18 net gains from sales of depreciable business property
were generally afforded capital gains treatment pursuant to section 1231,19 and
11 Storz v. Commissioner, 583 F.2d 972 (8th Cir. 1978); Midland-Ross Corp. v. United States, 485
F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1973); Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 265 F.2d 6 (9th Cir. 1959); Floyd v.
Scofield, 193 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1952); Williamson v. United States, 292 F.2d 524 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
12 Commissioner v. Kuckenberg, 309 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 909 (1963); Idaho
First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 265 F.2d 6 (9th Cir. 1959); Floyd v. Scofield, 193 F.2d 594 (5th Cir.
1952); Jud Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1946); Williamson v.
United States, 292 F.2d 524 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
13 Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F. 2d 399, 402 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Estate of Munter v.
Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663, 671 (1975); Bittker and Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.
265, 265-66 (1978).
14 The predecessor of I.R.C. S 111, section 22(b)(12) of the 1939 Code, was added to the Code by § 116
of the Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 668, 56 Stat. 812.
15 Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 506 (1943); Tye, The Tax Benefit Doctrine Reexamined, 3 TAx
L. REv. 329-30 (1948); Note, 21 VANO. L. REV. 995, 999-1001 (1968).
16 320 U.S. 489, 506 (1943). The Supreme Court stated:
A specific statutory exception was necessary in bad debt cases only because the courts reversed
the Tax Court and established as matter of law a "theoretically proper" rule which distorted the
taxpayer's income. Congress would hardly expect the courts to repeat the same error in another
class of cases, as we would do were we to affirm in this case.
Id.
17 Treas. Reg. S 1.111-1(a) (1956). The same regulation, however, removes from the general exclu-
sionary rule "deductions with respect to depreciation, depletion, amortization, or amortizable bond provi-
sion."
18 I.R.C. § 1245 was added by the Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, S 13(a)(1), 76 Stat. 1032.
I.R.C. S 1250 was added by the Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, tit. 2, § 231(a), 78 Stat. 100.
19 More precisely, I.R.C. § 1231 provides for a net capital gain if the recognized gains from sales or ex-
changes of property used in a trade or business, plus the recognized gains from the compulsory or involun-
tary conversion of property used in a trade or business and of capital assets, exceed the recognized losses
from such transactions. If such gains do not exceed such losses, a net ordinary loss results. I.R.C. S 1231(a).
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no gain was recognized on the liquidating distribution or preliquidation sales of
such property pursuant to sections 336 and 337. Sections 1245 and 1250 apply
to all dispositions of depreciable property and generally override all other Code
provisions, including such nonrecognition provisions as sections 336 and 337.2o
In dispositions of personal property and certain types of real property, section
1245 recaptures as ordinary income all previously taken depreciation deduc-
tions up to gain realized. 21 In dispositions of most types of real property, sec-
tion 1250 effects a recapture generally only to the extent of excess over straight
line depreciation. 22
In order to understand the application of the broad, judicially created tax
benefit rule as it applies to section 336 and 337 transactions, it is first necessary
to understand the development of the rule in two major areas of controversy:
(1) the preliquidation sale of expensed assets, and (2) the preliquidation sale
and incorporation transfer of accounts receivable with an unused bad debt
reserve.
A. Preliquidation Sales of Expensed Property
Assets such as materials and supplies not held for sale to customers and
having only a short useful life may be expensed under section 162. The tax-
payer may thus recover the assets' full cost as a deduction in the taxable year of
purchase even though their useful life may extend into the next taxable year.23
On the other hand, assets with a longer useful life should be capitalized and
their cost recovered by way of section 167 depreciation deductions over a
period of years corresponding to the assets' useful life.
A corporation which is about to liquidate may have on hand assets whose
full cost has been expensed in a prior taxable year but whose useful life has not
yet ended. Since the cost of these assets has been fully recovered their basis will
be zero. But since the assets have not yet been fully consumed, they will retain
Property used in a trade or business is defined generally as depreciable property and real property used in a
trade or business. I.R.C. § 1231(b)(1). Prior to 1977, the required holding period for § 1231 property was
more than six months. The holding period is now more than one year. See The Tax Reform Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-455, tit. 14, §§ 1402(b)(1)(R), (b)(2), 90 Stat. 1732. Gains for the sale of short term trade or
business property would be ordinary income since such gains are excluded from 5§ 1231 and 1221. See
§ 1221(2). Gains from the sale of depreciable property held in an income producing activity not amounting
to a trade or business (a rather narrow category) are afforded capital treatment under § 1221. The gain
would be long term or short term capital gain depending on the holding period.
The predecessor ofI.R.C. 5 1231, section 1170) of the 1939 Code, was added to the Code by § 151(b)
of the Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 668, 56 Stat. 846. Prior to 1942, depreciable business property was general-
ly afforded capital gain treatment by being included within the category of capital assets. During one brief
period between 1938 and 1942, gains and losses from the sale of depreciable business property were treated
as ordinary gains and losses. See Armstrong, Capital Gain Treatment Should be Restored for Depreciable Business
Property, 41 TAxEs 175, 183-85 (1963); McNerney, Disallowance of Depreciation in the Year of Sale at a Gain, 20
TAx L. REv. 615, 619 (1965).
20 I.R.C. §§ 1245(a)(1), (b), 1250(a)(1)(A), (d). The sole exception to recapture permitted in the cor-
porate liquidation area concerns distribution of property by an 80 percent or greater subsidiary where the
parent takes a carryover basis under I.R.C. § 334(b)(1). I.R.C. §§ 1245(b)(3), 1250(d)(3).
21 Depreciation subject to recapture is generally limited to that taken subsequent to December 31,
1961. I.R.C. § 1245(a)(2)(A).
22 In certain cases only a portion of the excess depreciation is recaptured. However, since December 31,
1975, such situations are very limited. See I.R.C. §§ 1250(a)(1)-(a)(3). In the case ofproperty held for a year
or less, I.R.C. § 1250(b)(1) effects a recapture of all depreciation.
23 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-3 (1958), 1.162-12 (1972), 1.471-1 (1958); Smith Leasing Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 43 T.C. 37, 40-41 (1964); Rev. Rul. 73-357, 1973-2 C.B. 40; Rev. Rul. 59-249, 1959-2 C.B. 55.
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some market value. These assets do not come within any of section 337's
specific exceptions to nonrecognition and, since they are not depreciable assets,
they are not subject to the recapture rules of sections 1245 and 1250 which
specifically override section 337.24 Beginning in 1969 a series of cases con-
sidered whether, under the general, judically created tax benefit rule, some
portion of the previously taken expense deductions should be recaptured as in-
come in the year of the preliquidation sale of expensed zero basis assets retain-
ing some market value.
In the first case, Commissioner v. Anders, 25 the taxpaying corporation rented
laundered towels, wiping and dusting materials, coveralls, and other items.
Most of the rented items had a useful life of twelve to eighteen months. Follow-
ing an admittedly proper practice, the corporation expensed and deducted the
full cost of these items in the year of their purchase. Pursuant to a plan of liq-
uidation under section 337, the corporation sold its expensed zero basis rental
items for $233,000. The taxpayer maintained that this sale resulted in gain
nonrecognizable under section 337. The government contended that since the
corporation had obtained a tax benefit when it deducted the cost of the items,
the tax benefit rule required recognition of the gain. The Tax Court upheld the
taxpayer, concluding that the tax benefit rule should not apply in the face of
section 337's clear and unambiguous nonrecognition rule. 26 Distinguishing the
assignment of income doctrine's application to section 337 liquidations, the
court stated: "The sale was of assets, not income. The fact that their income-
producing potential had not been exhausted when sold did not alter their
character as property used in the business of the corporation. "27
The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that section 337 contained no provi-
sion showing an intent to bar application of tax benefit principles fashioned
under other Code provisions. 28 The court stated:
The fact that a transaction involves disposition of property does not com-
pel treatment of the proceeds as gain from such a transfer. Instead, we con-
clude that tax benefit principles call for treatment of the proceeds not as gain
from the sale of property, but as ordinary income which was deducted on its
purchase. 29
The court distinguished Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner in which the
Supreme Court held that a taxpayer was entitled to take depreciation deduc-
tions in the year of sale of a business asset, and thus to achieve greater capital
gain on sale due to downward adjustment to basis resulting from the deprecia-
tion. Fribourg dealt with facts arising prior to the enactment of sections 1245
and 1250.31 The Tenth Circuit stated that while some comparisons could be
24 I.R.C. 9§ 1245(a)(3), 1250(c); see Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 528, 533-35
(Ct. Cl. 1973); Comment, 17 U. MIAMI L. REv. 619, 632 (1963).
25 414 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir. 1969) (rev'g 48 T.C. 815 (1967)), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958 (1969).
26 48 T.C. at 821.
27 Id. at 823.
28 414 F.2d at 1287.
29 Id. at 1288.
30 383 U.S. 272 (1966).
31 See note 18 supra.
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drawn between depreciation and expensing a rental item, in substance the
methods are not the same. 32 The former involves deductions over the useful life
of an asset, while the latter involves "no realization of appreciation in value en-
titled to . . . treatment" as gain from the sale of an asset. 33
In 1970, the government achieved another victory in Spitalny v. United
States. 34 In Spitalny the taxpayer expensed feed and supplies of its cattle feeding
business and sold these assets later in the same taxable year pursuant to section
337. The government argued for the restoration to income of the sales price of
these assets under the tax benefit rule. Alternatively, the government argued
that since both the deduction and the sale took place in the same taxable year,
the Commissioner could simply disallow the deduction pursuant to his authori-
ty under Section 446(b) to prevent distortion of income.
The Ninth Circuit agreed that the tax benefit rule can apply to expensed
property despite section 337's nonrecognition rule. 35 The court declared:
We agree that feed and supplies on hand are "property" under Section 337(b)
and, accordingly, that "gain" realized on their sale shall not be recognized.
The crucial question, however, is whether "gain" was realized. The assign-
ment of a zero basis to expensed items is not in response to adjustments in
valuation. It amounts, rather, to a present fictional conversion of that "prop-
erty" into a consumed item of expense. If the feed and supplies are to revert to
"property" they should be reconverted. They should not at the same time...
retain attributes of a fictional nonentity.
Under these circumstances what tax benefit principles do for purposes of
computing gain under section 337 is to give to the property sold its true basis
as property and deny to it the benefit of an adjusted basis which is false and
distorting and inconsistent with its very existence as property. 36
The court conceded, however, that when both the deduction and the off-
setting recovery occur in the same taxable year, it is appropriate to simply deny
the deduction under section 446 (b) rather than resort to the tax benefit rule. 37
Regarding application of section 446(b), the court stated:
The expense deduction as permitted by regulation is intended to reflect the
cost of feed actually consumed during the taxable year and to accomplish over a
period of years roughly the same result as would have been had through use of
the inventory method, but by a simpler form of accounting. Certainly it could
never have been intended that the cash basis method, on liquidation, should
provide such a startling advantage over the inventory method, which would
truly reflect the cost of feed actually consumed. 38
The court remanded the case for a factual determination of the cost of the feed,
32 414 F.2d at 1288.
33 Id. See further discussion of Fribourg in text accompanying notes 102-107 infra.
34 430 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1970).
35 Id. at 197-98.
36 Id. at 198.
37 Id. at 197-98.
38 Id. at 197 (italics in original). Under I.R.C. § 446(b), in effect, the corporation would be placed on
the inventory method of accounting as to the items in question. The cost of the items would thus enter into
the computation of the "cost of goods sold," and merely offset the proceeds of the liquidation sale.
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since if the feed were sold for more than its cost the sale price to that extent
would be nonrecognizable under section 337.39
The government also prevailed in decisions rendered by the Third Cir-
cuit, 40 the Court of Claims, 41 and the district courts. 4 2 Finally, in Estate of
Munter v. Commissioner ,4 3 the full Tax Court, with no dissenters, held the tax
benefit rule applicable to expensed items in liquidation sales under section 337.
Munter involved the preliquidation sale of rental items which had been ex-
pensed either in the year of sale or in the two years preceding the sale. Section
337 permitted nonrecognition of gain from the sale. The Tax Court ruled that
the receipt by the corporation of the additional tax benefit lacked legislative
support and was inconsistent with the general intent of Congress in enacting
revenue laws.44 The court considered the tax benefit rule applicable to both
deductions taken in the year of sale and deductions taken in prior years.4
These cases firmly establish the applicability of the tax benefit rule to
preliquidation sales of expensed assets. Although there is some uncertainty as
to whether it is more proper to apply the tax benefit rule or section 446(b) to
sales of assets expensed in the year of sale, the result to the taxpayer is the same
under both principles-the economic benefit of the deduction is lost. These
cases highlight the overriding role of the tax benefit rule: preventing distortions
of income arising from the taxpayer's use of a particular method of accounting.
B. Bad Debt Reserve
Section 166(c) permits an accrual method taxpayer to deduct a reasonable
reserve for bad debts instead of deducting specific bad debts. The amount of
bad debt reserve is derived by estimating the losses which reasonably can be ex-
39 Id. at 198.
40 Connery v. United States, 460 F.2d 1130 (3d Cir. 1972) (involving prepaid advertising expenses).
41 Anders v. United States, 462 F.2d 1147 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). In Anders the
court adopted reasoning similar to that in Spitalny holding that gain was realized not from a sale but from a
reconverting of previously expensed items into "property." Id. at 1149. The Anders court also took the posi-
tion that the tax benefit rule should apply regardless of whether the deduction and recovery occur in the
same taxable year. Id.
42 S.E. Evans, Inc. v. United States, 317 F. Supp. 423 (W.D. Ark. 1970); Krajeckv. United States, 36
A.F.T.R. 2d 75-5034 (D.N.D. 1975).
43 63 T.C. 663 (1975).
44 Id. at 676.
45 Id. at 677. In a footnote, the court stated that there was some similarity between the present case and
Fribourg Navigation Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272 (1966), which had allowed depreciation
deductions in the year of sale. 63 T.C. at 677 n.7. The court did not believe, however, that there was an in-
tention to expand the rationale of Fribourg to the Munter case.
In a concurring opinion two judges stated that it was unnecessary to base the rationale for the applica-
tion of the tax benefit principle on notions such as whether the items involved are "property" or whether the
proceeds of the disposition constitute "gain." 63 T.C. at 679. The tax benefit rule should simply be viewed
as a "necessary counterweight to the consequences of the annual accounting principle .... " Id. at 678.
I.R.C. 5 337 granted nonrecognition generally to gains from liquidating transactions but preserved the tax-
ability of income arising in the ordinary course of business. Section 337 should not exempt actual recoveries
of tax benefits; these recoveries should retain the characteristics of ordinary business income. Id. at 679. The
opinion distinguished Fribourg by stating that "[d]epreciation has been and continues to be considered sui
generis and the tension between the recovery of amounts preciously deducted and the tax benefit rule has
not been considered of such a character as to cause that rule to prevail. See [Treas. Reg. 9 1.111-1(a) (1956)]
.... " Id. Furthermore, without precluding application of the tax benefit rule to deductions taken in the
year of sale, the concurring judges were of the opinion that the government could properly pursue its alter-
native theory under I.R.C. 9 446(b) as to these deductions. Id. at 682.
See Atec Corp., [1977] T.C.M. (P-H) 77,438, for a reaffirmation of the application of the tax benefit
principle to expensed items under S 337.
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pected to result from the worthlessness of debts outstanding at the close of the
taxable year. 46 Under the reserve method, specific debts upon becoming
worthless are charged against the reserve and reduce its credit balance. If the
reserve's end of year credit balance cannot cover reasonably expected losses at-
tributable to debts outstanding at the end of the year, an appropriate addition
is made to the reserve. Such an addition is deductible. 47
In a series of cases prior to 1970, the courts held that upon liquidation of a
corporation accounting for its bad debts under the reserve method, the tax
benefit rule required that the remaining balance in the bad debt reserve be in-
cluded in the corporation's income. 48 While these cases generally involved
preliquidation sales pursuant to section 337, at least one case involved a liq-
uidating distribution in kind in the liquidation of a subsidiary corporation pur-
suant to section 334(b)(2). 49 Language from earlier nonliquidation cases was
often cited to the effect that a bad debt reserve previously deducted from in-
come must be included in income in the year in which the need for the contin-
uance of such a reserve ceases. 50 Some of the cases requiring inclusion of the
bad debt reserve in the course of liquidation specifically rejected the taxpayer's
contention that the reserve should not be included in income unless the amount
realized on the sale of accounts receivable exceeded their adjusted basis or "net
value" in the corporation's hands.5 1
In another series of pre-1970 cases, the courts considered whether a
transferor of accounts receivable upon incorporation of the transferor's
business must include the bad debt reserve in income. Section 351 provides for
the nonrecognition of gain or-loss on transfers of property to a corporation if the
transferors own eighty percent or more of the corporation's stock immediately
after the transfer. In Estate of Schmidt v. Commissioner,5 2 the Ninth Circuit re-
jected the Commissioner's contention that the transferor must include in in-
come the bad debt reserve when all he receives in return is stock representing
the receivables' face value less the reserve (net value). The Court stated that
although the transferor no longer "needed" the reserve, in an "economic"
sense he had not recovered the value of the reserve under these
circumstances.5 3 In Max Schuster v. Commissioner,54 a majority of the Tax Court
disagreed with Schmidt, holding that inclusion was required whether or not the
value of the stock received equaled the net value of the receivables. In the Tax
Court's view, inclusion was required because the transferor had taken a deduc-
46 See Treas. Reg. § 1.166-4 (1980).
47 J.E. Hawes Corp. v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 705, 707 (1965).
48 See, e.g., West Seattle Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1961); Citizens Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. United States, 290 F.2d 932 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Bird Management, Inc. v. Commissioner, 48
T.C. 586, 594-97 (1967); Argus, Inc. v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 705 (1965).
49 Argus, Inc. v. Commissioner 45 T.C. 63 (1965). See also First Nat'l State Bank v. Commissioner, 51
T.C. 419 (1968), where the taxpayer did not dispute the application of the tax benefit rule in a 5 334(b)(2)
distribution of accounts receivable with an unused bad debt reserve.
50 See, e.g., S. Rossin & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 652, 654 (2d Cir. 1940); Geyer, Cornell
& Newell, Inc. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 96 (1946).
51 Bird Management v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 586, 595-97 (1967); J.E. Hawes Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 44 T.C. 705, 708-09 (1965). But see West Seattle Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 228 F.2d 47, 50 (9th
Cir. 1961). The adjusted basis of the accounts receivable would be their face value less the bad debt reserve.
52 355 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1966).
53 Id. at 113. Because there was no recovery in an economic sense, the court stated that it was im-
material whether the reserve could be considered as having been transferred to the new corporation. Id.
54 50 T.C. 98 (1968).
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tion for anticipated bad debts which, due to incorporation, he would never sus-
tain.55 In addition, the court could find no provision in the statute permitting
the carryover of a bad debt reserve from the transferor to the transferee cor-
poration.56
In Nash v. United States,57 the Fifth Circuit adopted the Tax Court's posi-
tion in Schuster. To resolve the conflict between the Ninth and Fifth Circuits,
the Supreme Court reviewed Nash. The Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, 58 re-
jecting the Commissioner's argument that the "end of the need" could be
equated with a "recovery" "in the present context." 59 The Court declined to
rule that there was a recovery when the transferors received from the corpora-
tion only securities equal in value to the net value of the accounts transferred. 60
The Court stated that a "double benefit" to the transferor would have resulted
only if securities equal in value to the face amount of the receivables 61 had been
issued.
In Citizens Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 62 the district court considered
the tax benefit rule's applicability to bad debt reserves in section 337 liquida-
tions in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Nash. The court observed that
many pre-Nash decisions had held that a corporation recognized the entire
amount of its bad debt reserve upon liquidation pursuant to section 337 .63 The
court considered Nash as overruling those decisions, since the considerations
governing section 351 also govern section 337.64 Accordingly, the court held
that a bad debt reserve could be recaptured only to the extent the amount
received for the accounts receivable in the preliquidation sale exceeded the
receivables' net value. Although the Third Circuit reversed on factual
grounds, 65 it impliedly accepted the district court's reasoning that under Nash
the bad debt reserve could be recaptured only to the extent that the considera-
tion received exceeded the net value of the receivables. 66 In Revenue Ruling
78-279,67 the Internal Revenue Service accepted the district court's application
of Nash to section 337 liquidations. 68
55 Id. at 102.
56 Id. In answer to this majority contention, the dissenting opinion by Judge Simpson stated that prior
to the enactment of S 381, without specific statutory authorization, in some circumstances the courts had
permitted the carryover of tax attributes in a corporate reorganization. Id. at 103-04.
57 414 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd 398 U.S. 1 (1970).
58 398 U.S. 1 (1970).
59 Id. at 3-4.
60 Id. at 4.
61 Id. at 5. In Rev. Rul. 78-280, 1978-2 C.B. 139, the Service explained the proper treatment of ac-
counts receivable in the corporation's hands in a § 351 transaction in light of the Nash case.
62 320 F. Supp. 798 (D. Del. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 462 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1972).
63 320 F. Supp. at 804.
64 Id. at 803-04.
65 462 F.2d at 755-56. The Third Circuit reversed on the factual question of the extent to which the
amount realized on the sale exceeded the net value of the receivables. But see Home Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
United States, 514 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1015 (1975).
66 462 F.2d at 757.
67 Rev. Rul. 78-279, 1978-2 C.B. 135. The Service stated:
The burden is on the taxpayer to show that the amount received in excess of the net value of the
accounts receivable is not a recovery of a tax benefit but rather attributable to economic factors
such as appreciation in value of interest bearing accounts receivable resulting from changes in
prevailing interest rates.
Id. at 136.
68 Rev. Rul. 78-278, 1978-2 C.B. 134, held similarly with respect to liquidating distributions in kind in
liquidations of an 80 percent or more subsidiary pursuant to I.R.C. §§ 332, 334(b)(2).
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In view of Nash and the subsequent developments in the section 337 area,
the law is well settled as to preliquidation sales of accounts receivable where
unused bad debt reserves exist. However, Nash does raise the question whether
a taxpayer must have a "recovery" or "economic benefit" for the tax benefit
rule to apply. This question is crucial in determining the applicablility of the
tax benefit rule to liquidating distributions in kind.
C. Liquidating Distributions of Expensed Assets
Two cases have considered the applicability of the tax benefit rule to liq-
uidating distributions of expensed zero basis assets. Both Commissioner v. South
Lake Farms69 and Tennessee Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Commissioner 0 involved
liquidating distributions by eighty percent or greater subsidiaries to parent cor-
porations which had purchased the stock and then promptly adopted a plan of
liquidation. Under section 332 each parent acquired its subsidiary's assets tax
free. Under section 334(b)(2) each parent's basis in those assets equaled the
price paid for the subsidiary's stock, with certain adjustments. 7' This basis ap-
proximated the parent's basis had it simply purchased the assets directly.
Under the regulations 2 the precise basis of each acquired asset was determined
by allocating the price of the stock among the assets in accordance with their
fair market values on the date of the stock's purchase.
In South Lake Farms, the assets distributed to the parent consisted in part of
a cotton crop ready for harvesting and land prepared for the planting of barley.
During the taxable year of the liquidation and the preceding year, the sub-
sidiary had totally expensed its costs in planting the cotton crop and preparing
the land for the barley crop, taking approximately $700,000 in deductions.
Under section 334(b)(2) the parent took a total basis in the cotton crop and
land preparation of approximately $1,800,000. The parent then offset against
its gross receipts from the cotton and barley crops its acquired basis of
$1,800,000, as well as its subsequent harvesting and planting costs.
The Commissioner's first contention, based on section 446(b), was that
the subsidiary should include as income in its last taxable year the $1,800,000
fair market value of the cotton crop and land preparation on the date of liquida-
tion. The Commissioner argued it would be a distortion of income should the
See also Messer v. Commissioner, 438 F.2d 774, 780 (3d Cir. 1971) (tax benefit rule applied to amount
received during 5 337 liquidation in settlement of a contested royalty obligation formerly deducted from in-
come); James M. Pierce Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1964) (tax benefit rule applied to
subscription reserves in § 337 liquidation); and Bishop v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 1105 (M.D. Ga.
1971) (tax benefit rule overrode that portion of 5 337 which extends nonrecognition treatment to bulk sales
of inventory). For a result similar to that in Bishop, see Winer v. Commissioner, 371 F.2d 684 (Ist Cir. 1967).
In Rev. Rul. 74-431, 1974-2 C.B. 107, the Service held that the tax benefit rule did not apply to a § 337 bulk
sale of LIFO inventory. But see the 1980 amendments to §5 336 and 337 with respect to LIFO inventory.
Pub. L. No. 96-223, 55 403(b)(1), (b)(2)(A), 94 Stat. 304, adding §§ 336(b) and 337(0.
69 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963), aff'g 36 T.C. 1027 (1961).
70 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978), ,.j"g 65 T.C. 440 (1975), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979).
71 The S 334(b)(2) basis applies when one corporation acquires 80% of the stock of another corporation
by purchase within a twelve month period and within two years thereafter adopts a plan to liquidate the ac-
quired corporation. The normal basis of the parent in the assets acquired in the liquidation of an 80 percent
subsidiary is that of the subsidiary. I.R.C. § 334(b)(1).
72 Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c)(4)(vi)(b)(1972).
[December 1980]
TAX BENEFIT RULE
taxpayer deduct the operation's expenses without reporting its income.3
However, the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument on the ground that under
no method of accounting could the taxpayer be deemed to have earned income
from the unharvested cotton and the unplanted barley. 74
The Commissioner's alternative argument sounded in "tax benefit,"
although it relied directly on section 446(b). The Commissioner observed that
the price of the subsidiary's stock was dependent upon the value of the cotton
crop and the land preparation, and that part of the stock purchase price had
been allocated to the cotton crop and land preparation for the purpose of fixing
the purchasing corporation's basis under section 334(b)(2). The Commissioner
argued that the subsidiary had consequently "received an amount equivalent
to, and sufficient to offset, the expenses it had incurred, and hence was no
longer entitled to the 'tax benefit' of the deduction of these expenses." 7 5
The Ninth Circuit rejected the government's alternate argument, declar-
ing:
One immediate difficulty with this contention is that the old corporation
received nothing. It was the stock of the old corporation that was sold, and the
stockholders who got the money. The price that they got was higher because of
the values added to the old corporation's assets by the expenditures that were
made in preparing the barley lands and in preparing, planting, and growing
the cotton crop. No doubt they paid tax on the increased gain. Nowhere in the
Code do we find an intent that gains of the stockholders were to be attributed
to the corporation, much less that they were to be treated as ordinary income
to the corporation. The corporation is to be taxed only on its own income. 76
In Tennessee-Carolina, the subsidiary corporation, a motor freight transpor-
tation operation, distributed to its parent in the course of liquidation some 1600
tires and tubes whose cost had been previously expensed. At the time of
distribution, 67.5% of the useful life of these tires and tubes remained. The
government conceded that the parent was entitled to deduct in the year of ac-
quisition the fair market value of the tires and tubes on the date of acquisi-
tion-its basis for such items under section 334(b)(2). 77 The government
argued, however, that the subsidiary was required to recognize income on the
distribution of the tires and tubes under the tax benefit rule.
The majority of the Tax Court agreed with the government, holding that
the subsidiary had gross income to the extent of the lesser of (1) the fair market
value of the tires and tubes distributed, and (2) the portion of the cost of the
73 324 F.2d at 838; 36 T.C. at 1035-37.
74 324 F.2d at 838-39. The Tax Court similarly rejected the Commissioner's argument. 36 T.C. at
1037-40.
75 324 F.2d at 839.
76 Id. In the Tax Court, the Commissioner based his alternative argument on I.R.C. S 482, not
5446(b). 36 T.C. at 1040-41. Section 482 provides that, in the case of any two or more corporations, owned
or controlled by the same interests, the Commissioner may allocate gross income or deductions between the
corporations if necessary to prevent evasion of taxes or to reflect clearly the income of such entities. The Tax
Court rejected this argument, holding that under § 482 the Commissioner could not simply disallow a
deduction to one corporation without allocating it to another corporation. The allowance to the purchasing
corporation of a fair market value basis of the items in question was not the allocation of a deduction, but
merely the allowance of the basis to which it was entitled under § 334(b)(2). 36 T.C. at 1042.
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, there was a long dissenting opinion based on tax benefit and assign-
ment of income principles and I.R.C. §§ 446(b) and 482. 324 F.2d at 840-53.
77 65 T.C. at 446 n.4.
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stock attributable to the tires' and tubes' useful life remaining on the date of
distribution. 78 The majority disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's apparent posi-
tion in South Lake Farms precluding "recovery" under the tax benefit rule
unless the acquiring corporation has actually received or become entitled to
receive money or property. 79
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court, rejecting the argument that
there was no "recovery" on three grounds. 80 First, citing a dictum in Block v.
Commissioner,81 a 1939 Board of Tax Appeals decision, the court held that the
tax benefit rule should apply not only if there is a physical recovery of a tangi-
ble asset or sum but also if there is another event inconsistent with the prior
deduction. Here, the transfer to the acquiring corporation of tires and tubes
having a substantial remaining useful life was inconsistent with their prior ex-
pensing .which indicated that the tires and tubes had been or would be totally
used by the subsidiary.
Second, following the Tax Court's reasoning, 82 the court noted that when
the tires and tubes were expensed their basis became zero and they became
nonentities for tax purposes on the assumption that they would be consumed
by the subsidiary. The transfer of these still useful assets in liquidation is incon-
sistent with this assumption. Thus, in transferring these assets the subsidiary
must be deemed to have recovered them. Third, the court held that a recovery
occurred in that the subsidiary received its own stock in exchange for the
transferred assets. Although it had no value after the liquidation, the stock had
considerable value at the time of its receipt by the subsidiary.
The Sixth Circuit denied that United States v. Nash,8 3 dealing with the
transfer of accounts receivable under section 351, stood for the proposition that
there must be an actual physical recovery of previously deducted amounts. 84
The court distinguished Nash on two grounds.8 5 First, Nash involved not the
transfer of an item which had been the subject of a prior deduction, but only
the transfer of what remained after the deduction. 86 Second, the bad debt
reserve deduction in Nash "reflected business reality since only the net value of
the receivables could realistically be recovered; here the expense deduction did
not reflect business reality since the tires and tubes were not in fact consumed
by [the subsidiary]." '87
In addition, the Sixth Circuit observed that a finding of no recovery would
produce an unnecessary disparity between liquidations under section 336 and
78 Id. at 448.
79 Id. at 447. A concurring opinion by judge Simpson emphasized that no position was being expressed
as to the tax consequences of expensed property's distribution in a liquidation not governed by I.R.C.
5 334(b)(2). 65 T.C. at 449.
80 582 F.2d at 382.
81 39 B.T.A. 338, 341 (1939), aff'd sub noma. Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 60 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 658 (1940). The statement in Block is dictum because an actual recovery was involved
under its facts.
82 65 T.C. at 447-48.
83 398 U.S. 1 (1970), discussed in text accompanying notes 58-61 supra.
84 582 F.2d at 382-83.
85 Id. at 383.
86 Id.
87 Id. The majority opinion in the Tax Court stated that Nash supported its position in Tennessee-Carolina
since Nash implied that the bad debt reserve would have been includable in income to the extent the fair
market value of the receivables exceeded their net worth. 65 T.C. at 449. The present situation is analogous
to one in which the fair market value of the receivables exceeds their net worth.
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those under section 337.88 This disparity would have been evident in the pres-
ent case had the subsidiary sold its assets to the parent and then made a liq-
uidating distribution of the proceeds to its shareholders. In such an event sec-
tion 337 would not have precluded application of the tax benefit rule. 89 The
court stated that section 336 liquidations should be treated like section 337 liq-
uidations as a general rule unless some peculiar provision of section 337
justifies different treatment. 90 No such statutory justification existed in the
present case. Indeed, the court noted that section 337 was enacted precisely to
eliminate formalistic distinctions between liquidating distributions in kind and
preliquidation sales. 91
The dissenting judges in the Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit objected to
the application of the tax benefit rule in a section 336 distribution because of
the absence of any economic recovery by the distributing corporation. 92 In con-
trast, a section 337 preliquidation disposition would have resulted in such a
recovery. The dissenting judges in the Tax Court, however, would have per-
mitted an adjustment in the case of a liquidating distribution in kind if the
deduction was taken in the year the distribution of assets was made. The ad-
justment would take the form of a denial of the deduction pursuant to the Com-
missioner's section 446(b) authority to change a taxpayer's accounting method
when that method does not clearly reflect income. 93
The dissenters in both the Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit pointed to the
fact that all the cases supporting the government's position involved an
economic recovery through either (1) receipt of funds or (2) release of an ac-
crued liability increasing the taxpayer's net worth.94 According to the
dissenters, the only recovery that could be considered to have taken place in
Tennessee-Carolina was the distributing corporation's receipt of its own stock.
Such receipt could not be considered an economic recovery, since a corpora-
tion's stock has no value when the corporation has terminated its business and
distributed its assets. 95 The dissenters also found the majority's holding incon-
sistent with Nash, seeing no difference between the "end of the need" argu-
ment rejected by the Supreme Court in Nash and the "inconsistent event" ra-
tionale embraced by the majority in Tennessee-Carolina.96
The dissenters also asserted that Congress had nowhere evidenced an in-
88 582 F.2d at 380-81, 383.
89 See text accompanying notes 19-38 supra for treatment of S 337 deductions.
90 582 F.2d at 381.
91 Id. at 383.
92 65 T.C. 440, 449-55; 582 F.2d 378, 383-88. The majority cited I.R.C. S 337(b)'s "unique denial of
nonrecognition to gain or loss from sales in the ordinary course of business during the relevant twelve-month
period" as a provision with no counterpart in I.R.C. § 336. 582 F.2d at 381 n.10. See Midland-Ross Corp.
v. United States, 485 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1973).
93 65 T.C. at 454-55. Six other judges concurred in Judge Tannenwald's dissent.
94 65 T.C. at 450; 582 F.2d at 384. Situation (1) is exemplified by Estate of Block v. Commissioner, 39
B.T.A. 338 (1939), in which a taxpayer who took a deduction for estate taxes paid in one year was required
to include as income a refund of the taxes received in another year. Situation (2) would be exemplified by
Mayfair Minerals, Inc., v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 82 (1971), aff'dper curiam, 456 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972).
In Mayfair Minerals a taxpayer had deducted as an accrued liability the amount of refunds it was required to
make to its customers under a challenged order of the Federal Power Commission. The taxpayer was re-
quired to include the amount formerly deducted as income in the year in which "its contingent liability to
make the refunds terminated, the account payable was closed, and the money which the accruals
represented became available for its general use." 56 T.C. at 87.
95 65 T.C. at 451; 582 F.2d at 385.
96 65 T.C. at 451; 582 F.2d at 384-85. See text accompanying notes 53-57 supra..
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tent that all liquidations under sections 336 and 337 should have the same tax
result. 97 Instead, they declared Congress' concern in enacting section 337 was
the elimination of corporate level tax differences resulting from court opinions
which made tax consequences turn on whether a liquidating corporation rather
than its shareholders sold the assets. The Sixth Circuit dissent concluded:
[I]n justifying the application of the tax benefit rule to the facts of the case by
relying on Section 337 cases, [the majority] fail to perceive that Section 337
was enacted as a shield to protect the taxpayer, and not as a sword to be uti-
lized by the government.
If there is to be a parity in tax treatment under the two sections, the tax
results dictated by Section 336 should control Section 337, and not vice
versa.98
D. Analysis of Tennessee-Carolina
A simple illustration will typify the Tennessee-Carolina facts. S Corporation,
a calendar year taxpayer, acquires a business asset in mid-1979 for $100. Since
the asset has a useful life of one year, S properly expenses the cost under section
162 and receives a $100 tax deduction in its 1979 tax return. S's basis in the
asset is thus zero. At the beginning of 1980, P Corporation acquires all the
stock of S Corporation and immediately liquidates S pursuant to section
334(b)(2). S's only asset at the time of its acquisition by P is the expensed asset
which has a remaining useful life of six months. The asset has a fair market
value of $50, since the asset is half consumed. S has no outstanding liabilities
immediately prior to the acquisition.
Under Tennessee-Carolina, in distributing the expensed asset S Corporation
must include in its 1980 taxable income the lesser of(1) the fair market value of
the asset or (2) the portion of the cost attributable to the asset's remaining
useful life as of the date of distribution.99 Under our facts (1) and (2) are the
same figure-$50. Assuming an effective tax rate of twenty percent, S will in-
cur a tax liability of $10. Under section 334(b)(2), P takes a basis in the asset
equal to its cost for the stock ($50) plus, presumably, an additional $10 to
reflect P's additional out-of-pocket expense in assuming S's tax liability. 10 0 P,
97 65 T.C. at 453; 582 F.2d at 387-88.
98 582 F.2d at 388. The Sixth Circuit dissent contended that the subsidiary's shareholders, and not the
subsidiary, recovered the tax benefit resulting from the expensing of the tires and tubes. Id. at 384-85. The
dissent also contended that the "fictional reconversion" rationale used in Spitalny v. United States, 430
F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1970), "did not constitute the requisite recovery for tax benefit purposes, but rather, was
used to circumvent the nonrecognition provision of 5 337 so that the tax benefit rule could be applied." 582
F.2d at 387; see quotation in text accompanying note 36 supra.
99 Tennessee-Carolina Trans., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. at 448.
100 Under I.R.C. § 334(b)(2), the Treasury is authorized to adopt regulations prescribing adjustments
in the parent's basis in the subsidiary's stock "for any liabilities assumed or subject to which the property
was received, and for other items." Under Treas. Reg. 5 1.334-1(c)(4)(v) (1960), the parent's basis in the
subsidiary stock must be increased:
(1) by the amount of any unsecured liabilities assumed by the parent, and
(2) by the portion of the subsidiary's earnings and profits (less the amount of any distributions
therefrom) of the period beginning on the date of purchase and ending upon the date of the last
distribution in liquidation attributable to the stock of the subsidiary held by the parent.
The impact of this regulation on the parent's basis when the subsidiary must recognize income on the
distribution of expensed assets is not entirely clear. See O'Hare, Application of Tax Benefit Rule in New Case
Threatens Certain Liquidations, 44J. TAX. 200, 202-03 (1976). Arguably, the regulations require that, in our
example in the text, the parent increase its basis in the asset to $100. The components of the $100 basis
would be as follows: (1) $50, the cost of the stock; (2) $10, the tax liability of the subsidiary arising from ap-
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which will use the asset for the remainder of its useful life, will properly take an
immediate deduction for its full cost of the asset ($60).
The treatment of S and P under Tennessee-Carolina conforms with sound
tax policy and represents a proper economic result. If S is to obtain an im-
mediate deduction for the full cost of the asset it should fully consume the asset
in its business. If S disposes of the asset prematurely, some accounting
mechanism must be employed to prevent the resulting distortion. The tax
benefit rule in effect limits S to a deduction for half the asset's cost; °1 0 a result
which comports with the fact that S used the asset for only half its useful life.
Tennessee-Carolina is consistent with Fribourg Navigation Co. v.
Commissioner, 10 2 which involved depreciation deductions taken prior to enact-
ment of the recapture provisions in sections 1245 and 1250. The taxpayer in
Fribourg had purchased a used Liberty ship for $469,000 on December 21,
1955. With the Service's approval, the taxpayer depreciated the ship on a
straight line basis assuming that its useful life was three years and that its value
after those three years would be $54,000. The taxpayer took depreciation for
the ten days remaining in 1955 and the whole of 1956, adjusting its basis by the
$326,627 depreciation. During 1957, the market value of ships rose sharply
due to the Suez Canal crisis. The taxpayer sold the ship for $695,500 in a sec-
tion 337 transaction on December 23, 1957. The taxpayer claimed $135,367 in
depreciation on the ship for 357 days of 1957 and argued that its $504,239 gain
was tax-free under section 337.
Because the recapture of depreciation provisions had not been enacted at
that time, 03 section 337 made the entire gain tax-free. The Commissioner,
however, sought to deny the depreciation deductions taken in 1957 by arguing
that, since the ship's sale price exceeded the adjusted basis as of the beginning
plication of the tax benefit rule, assumed by the parent; and (3) $40, the net increase in the earnings and
profits arising from the recognition of income by the subsidiary ($50 of recognized income minus $10 of tax
liability). This result is supported by two cases involving the analogous situations of the subsidiary recaptur-
ing either depreciation under I.R.C. S§ 1245 and 1250 or recapturing an unused bad debt reserve under
pre-Nash law. R.M. Smith, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 317, 323-28 (1977), aff'd, 591 F.2d 248 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828 (1979); First Nat'l State Bank v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 419 (1968). The
result seems unsupportable as a matter of policy. Under such an approach, the parent would be taking a
basis of $100 in the expensed asset when its out of pocket cost was only $60 ($50 cost of the stock plus $10 of
assumed tax liability). Moreover, although differing tax results might ensue because the tax brackets of the
parent and subsidiary might differ, nevertheless, the granting of a $100 basis to the parent essentially
negates the consequences of forcing the subsidiary to recognize $50 of income upon distributing the asset.
The preferable approach grants a $60 basis to the parent (the $50 cost basis of the stock adjusted by the
assumption of the $10 tax liability of the subsidiary). This approach has been put forth by a number of com-
mentators and is apparently the government's approach. See O'Hara, Liquidation of Subsidiaries-Basis-Sec.
334(bX2), 16-4th TAx MNOM'T (BNA) A19-21 (1978); Horvitz, Depreciation Recapture-Corporate Transactions,
268 TAx MNOM'T (BNA) A48-51 (1972). The adjustment to basis prescribed by the regulations should be
confined to sales and exchanges of assets occurring between the purchase of the subsidiary's stock and liq-
uidation of the subsidiary, and should not embrace gain generated by the distribution of the subsidiary's
assets. O'Hara, supra.
If income is generated by the distribution of an asset because of the depreciation recapture rules or the
tax benefit doctrine, there is some question whether the resulting increase in the parent's basis is to be
relegated solely to the asset generating the increase or is to be distributed among all the distributed assets in
proportion to their net fair market value. See O'Hare, supra, at 202; Horvitz, supra at A51-53; Morrison,
Assignment of Income and Tax Benefit Principles in Corporate Liquidations, 54 TAXEs 902, 920-22 (1976). This ques-
tion is not presented by the facts in the example in the text because the expensed asset is the only asset
distributed.
101 The restoration to income of a previously deducted amount does not necessarily lead to the precise
dollar amount resulting had the deduction not been taken in the first place. In the year of restoration, the
taxpayer may be in a tax bracket different than the one in the year of deduction.
102 383 U.S. 272 (1966).
103 See note 18 supra.
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of that year, the use of the ship during the year of sale "cost" the taxpayer
nothing. 10 4 The United States Supreme Court rejected the Commissioner's
contention, stating:
By tying depreciation to sale price in this manner, the Commissioner has com-
mingled two distinct and established concepts of tax accounting-depreciation
of an asset through wear and tear or gradual expiration of useful life and fluc-
tuations in the value of that asset through changes in price levels or market
values. 105
The Court held that depreciation cannot be disallowed when there is no
challenge to the accuracy of the original estimates of useful life and salvage
value, and that depreciation cannot take into account fluctuations in value due
to market appreciation.10 6
Fribourg does not run counter to the argument that in our example, S Cor-
poration should be limited to a $50 deduction because it only utilized the asset
over half of its useful life. Fribourg merely held that in calculating depreciation
deductions, one cannot take into account subsequent increases in the asset's
market value. Increases in market value have no bearing on S and P's situa-
tion. All that should be taken into account is the fact that the taxpayer, having
deducted the entire expense of the asset, has disposed of the asset before the
end of its useful life. If in S and P's situation the market value of the asset in-
creased to $75, only $50 would be required to be returned to income. This gain
is attributable to the prior deduction'0 7 and not to market appreciation. The
other $25 realized is gain attributable to market appreciation and would escape
taxation under section 336.10
Limiting S's deduction to that portion of the asset's cost corresponding to
the time during which S actually used the asset comports with depreciation
policy. Depreciation is calculated over the useful life of an asset on a daily
basis.10 9 Expensing, like depreciation, is a method of cost recovery. If an asset
has a short useful life, the taxpayer is granted the benefit of taking a deduction
for its entire cost in the year in which the asset is first put to use. This should
not, however, change the end result. The taxpayer is deemed to have been
granted the deduction on the assumption that the asset will be used for its en-
tire useful life. To the extent the taxpayer does not use the asset for its entire
104 383 U.S. at 276.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 276-79.
107 Compare Bishop v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 1105, 1111 (M.D. Ga. 1971).
108 See text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.
109 A rapid recovery of cost in the early years of an asset's life can be achieved by using accelerated
methods of depreciation. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b) (1973). In contrast, the straight line method spreads the
recovery of cost evenly over the life of the asset. Prior to the enactment of the recapture rules in §S 1245 and
1250, downward adjustments to basis caused by accelerated depreciation often resulted in greater capital
gain on disposition. This was one of the reasons for the enactment of §§ 1245 and 1250. See H.R. REP. No.
1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), 1962-3 C.B. 405, 470-71. The capital gain result for depreciable business
property was dictated specifically by § 1231. See discussion of § 1231 in note 19 supra. Presumably because of
this specific grant of capital gain treatment, no attempt was ever made by the government to override
§ 1231 or §§ 336 or 337 by applying thejudicially created tax benefit principle to dispositions of depreciable
property. Sections 1245 and 1250 now override §S 1231, 336 and 337.
If the tax benefit doctrine were not applied to the disposition of an expensed asset, the gain recognized
on a regular, nonliquidation sale of such an asset would be entirely capital. An expensed asset is not within
any of the specific exclusions to the definition of a capital asset in § 1221. Not being a depreciable asset, an
expensed asset would not be within § 1231.
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useful life, as a matter of proper tax accounting there must be an adjustment in
the taxpayer's taxable income.1 10
The dissenters in Tennessee-Carolina objected to the application of the tax
benefit rule because a corporation enjoys no economic recovery when it
distributes assets to its shareholders, whereas it does make an economic
recovery when it sells its assets. The Tax Court dissenters would have permit-
ted an accounting adjustment pursuant to section 446(b) if the deduction had
been taken in the same year as the distribution of assets."' No adjustment by
way of the tax benefit rule could be made if the deduction were taken in a year
prior to the distribution.
Two arguments could be made that the subsidiary in Tennessee-Carolina en-
joyed an economic recovery. The first argument is that the subsidiary had an
economic recovery in receiving its own stock in return for the assets
distributed. Immediately prior to distribution of the assets, the stock's value
equaled the value of the distributed assets. Section 331 treats the retirement of
stock for assets as a sale or exchange for the purpose of providing capital gain
treatment to the gain realized by the shareholder.11 2 This argument, rejected
by the dissenters in Tennessee-Carolina, 1 1 3 is open to the objection that the stock
is being exchanged solely for the purpose of cancellation pursuant to termina-
tion of the corporation's existence. The second argument is based upon a
characterization of a section 334(b)(2) transaction as essentially a sale of the
subsidiary's assets to the parent followed by a liquidating distribution.1 14
Although for basis purposes, section 334(b)(2) treats the parent as if it had pur-
chased the subsidiary's assets rather than its stock, it does not follow that a sale
of assets can be imputed to the subsidiary for purposes other than prescribing
the parent's basis in the acquired assets. Moreover, the argument furnishes a
narrow base for the result reached in Tennessee-Carolina because its rationale
would not cover other liquidation transactions such as a liquidating distribu-
tion in kind to an individual shareholder or a less than eighty percent corporate
parent.
Rather than rely on these two tenuous arguments, it seems better to rely
on the majority's first argument in Tennessee-Carolina that an event inconsistent
with the prior deduction suffices to trigger application of the tax benefit rule.
The majority's second argument-that the subsidiary, not having fully con-
sumed the expensed asset after taking a deduction for its full cost, must be
deemed to have received the asset at the time of liquidation-appears to be no
more than a further elaboration of the "inconsistent event" argument.
The essence of the "inconsistent event" argument is that the taxpayer was
granted a deduction for the full cost of the asset on the assumption that the tax-
payer would fully utilize the asset. The transfer of the asset when it has a re-
maining useful life and when the transferee takes a step-up in basis to a fair
market value reflecting the remaining useful life is inconsistent with the prior
110 See Note, 21 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1007 (1968); But see Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 506-07
(1943).
Ill 65 T.C. at 454-55.
112 See Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 378, 382 n.15.
113 See text accompanying footnote 95 supra.
114 This argument was alluded to by the Tax Court dissent (65 T.C. at 452-53) and by the Sixth Circuit
majority (582 F. 2d at 382 n.14),
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deduction for the full cost of the asset. Consequently, in the year in which the
inconsistent event occurs, the taxpayer must restore the prior deduction to in-
come to the extent the taxpayer did not consume the asset in its business. 115
The event triggering application of the tax benefit rule usually involves an
economic recovery since the acquired enterprise usually continues rather than
terminates its business. Because it may be difficult to conceptualize a true
economic recovery when a corporation makes a distribution in the course of
terminating its business, the decisive factor should be the presence not of an
economic recovery but of an event inconsistent with the taking of a prior
deduction. An economic recovery is simply the usual manifestation of an "in-
consistent event." ' 116
The tax benefit rule has been designed by the courts as a tool for correct-
ing the distortion resulting from a taxpayer's taking a deduction which, in the
light of subsequent events, exceeds his loss or cost. " 7 The extension of the rule
to the liquidating distribution of an expensed asset is within this basic rationale
and policy." 8
Much can be said for the argument of the Sixth Circuit dissent in
Tennessee-Carolina' 9 that the same tax consequences do not necessarily attend a
section 336 distribution as a section 337 sale and that section 337 was enacted
merely to eliminate the technical distinctions arising from the attribution to a
corporation of sales by shareholders. 20 Nevertheless, from a tax policy stand-
point it does not make sense that in applying a judicially created rule intended
to avoid income distortions, results should differ depending on whether a cor-
poration liquidates by way of section 336 or 337. The assignment of income
doctrine has been applied in equal measure to both section 336 and 337 trans-
actions.' 2' The same should hold true for the tax benefit rule.
The result in Nash12 2 is consistent with the application of the tax benefit
rule in the Tennessee-Carolina situation. Nash involved a section 351 transfer of
accounts receivable with an unused bad debt reserve. The Nash Court held that
there was no "recovery" because the value of the stock did not exceed the net
value of the receivables. This net value equaled the transferor's adjusted basis
in the receivables (face value less bad debt reserve). Thus, no gain was realized
in any sense. Nor was any double tax benefit involved. Under section 362 the
transferee corporation took the same basis in the receivables as they had in the
hands of the transferor. The transferee corporation could not deduct as an ad-
115 This is true providing the fair market value of the distributed asset is not less than the portion of the
cost attributable to its remaining useful life. The precise formula for determining the amount to be restored
to income is set forth in text accompanying note 78 supra.
116 But see dictum in Block v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 338, 341 (1939).
117 Bittker and Kanner, supra note 13, at 267-70. See Estate of Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663,
678-79 (1975) (Tannenwald, J. concurring); Barnett v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 864, 867 (1939). In a dic-
tum in Barnett the Board of Tax Appeals used "inconsistent event" language similar to that in Block v.
Commissioner, 322 U.S. 275, 285-87, 289-90 (1944). But see United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678,
684-85 (1969).
118 The Seventh Circuit has recently endorsed the "inconsistent event" rationale of Tennessee-Carolina.
First Trust & Say. Bank v. United States, 614 F.2d 1142, 1146 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'g 44 A.F.T.R. 2d 5253
(C.D. Il. 1979). However, a traditional "recovery" occurred under the facts of that case. See also Rosen v.
United States, 611 F.2d 942 (1st Cir. 1980).
119 See text accompanying notes 97-98 supra.
120 See authorities cited at note 9 supra and Midland-Ross Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 110, 117-18
(6th Cir. 1973).
121 See cases cited at note 11 supra.
122 See discussion of Nash in text accompanying notes 58-61 supra.
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dition to its bad debt reserve the difference between the face amount of the
receivables and its basis in the receivables. This amount was already deducted
by the transferor in setting up its own bad debt reserve and was reflected in the
transferee's basis in the receivables.1 23
Tennessee-Carolina, however, involved entirely different facts. In that case
the subsidiary transferred assets in which it had a zero basis due to its taking a
prior deduction for the assets' full cost. The assets retained a fair market value
because they were only partially consumed. Thus, the value of the assets
distributed exceeded the corporation's basis in the assets, and the assets' value
was reflected in the value of the stock immediately before liquidation.
Moreover, in Tennessee-Carolina unlike Nash, there would be a "doubling" of
deductions if the tax benefit doctrine were not applied. The subsidiary in
Tennessee-Carolina had received a deduction for the full cost of the assets even
though it had only partially consumed them. The parent took a step-up in basis
to fair market value under section 334(b)(2), and could thus deduct its full cost
in the assets. Failure to apply the tax benefit doctrine would have had the un-
sound effect of allowing two corporations to deduct their full cost in the assets
even though one corporation transferred those assets to the other in a usable
state. 1
24
123 Rev. Rul. 78-280, 1978-2 C.B. 139, 140. This ruling generally discusses the treatment of accounts
receivable in the hands of the corporation after a 5 351 transfer in light of the Nash case. The ruling sets forth
guidelines for corporations using the reserve method for bad debts and for corporations using the specific
charge-off method. In both situations, the ruling prevents the corporation from taking a deduction with
respect to accounts receivable already taken by the transferor. Compare Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1,
4-5.
The same considerations are involved in a § 337 sale of accounts receivable to which Naah was applied
in Citizens' Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 320 F. Supp. 798 (D. Del. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 462
F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1972). If the proceeds from the 5 337 sale do not exceed the net value of the accounts
receivable, there will be no income to the liquidating corporation. Because the amount realized does not ex-
ceed the corporation's adjusted basis in the receivables (face less bad debt reserve), the corporation has not
realized gain in any sense. Furthermore, as in the S 351 situation, there is no double tax benefit. The buyer
will take a basis in the receivables equal to the adjusted basis of the liquidating corporation (face less bad
debt reserve), because the adjusted basis is the amount paid for the receivables. The buyer should not be
able to deduct as an addition to its bad debt reserve the difference between the face amount of the receivables
and its basis in the receivables. This amount was already deducted by the liquidating corporation in an-
ticipating its bad debts, and these infirmities are reflected in the amount paid for the receivables. Compare
Citizens' Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 320 F. Supp. at 801.
124 A long line of cases expresses a policy against double deductions: see, e.g., Charles Ilfeld Co. v. Her-
nandez, 292 U.S. 62, 68 (1934); Levi Strauss Realty Co. v. United States, 41 F.2d 55 (9th Cir.), cert. denid,
282 U.S. 868 (1930); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. United States, 337 F.2d 637, 640 (Ct. 01. 1964).
For other analyses of the application of the tax benefit rule to liquidating distributions see Faber, Sale of
a Business, 37 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAx. 5-26 to 5-34, 5-59 to 5-67 (1979); Bonovitz, Problems in Achieving Pari!y
in Tax Treatment under Sections 337 and 334(b)(2), 34 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 57, 67-72 (1976); O'Hare,
Statutory Nonrecognition of Income and the Overriding Principle of the Tax Benefit Rule in the Taxation of Corporations and
Shareholders, 27 TAX. L. REv. 215, 233-38 (1972); Note, The Application of the Tax Benefit Rule to Corporate
Distributions of Expensed Assets under I.R.C. § 336, 29 CASE W. L. REv. 700 (1979).
The impact of the Tennessee-Carolina case on liquidations other than those under S 334(b)(2) warrants
comment. The case would not have any application in the liquidation of an 80% or greater subsidiary where
the basis of the parent is determined under § 334(b)(1), the general basis rule for the liquidation of such sub-
sidiaries. In a S 334(b)(1) liquidation, the basis of the subsidiary in the assets distributed carries over to the
parent. Under the Tennessee-Carolina facts, the basis of the parent in the expensed asset would be zero. There
is no need for restoration of the previously deducted amount to the subsidiary's income. The parent simply
steps into the shoes of the subsidiary and there is only one deduction for the cost of the asset, unlike in the
case of a § 334(b)(2) liquidation. Section 381(c)(12), in fact, provides that in corporate reorganizations and
§ 334(b)(1) liquidations, if the acquiring corpoiation is entitled to the recovery of bad debts or prior taxes or
delinquency amounts previously deducted by the transferor corporation, the acquiring corporation shall in-
clude in its income such amounts as would have been includable by the transferor in accordance with § 111.
Treas. Reg. § 1.381(c)(12)-1(a)(2) (1961) extends this principle generally to "all other losses, expenditures
and accruals made the basis of deduction from the gross income of a distributor or transferor corporation for
prior taxable years .... " In view of these provisions, Rev. Rul. 74-396, 1974-2 C.B. 106, 107, explicitly
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III. Contributions to Capital and the Tax Benefit Rule
The problems inherent in applying the tax benefit rule to capital contribu-
tions are typified by the following illustration. T, an individual, owns fifty per-
cent or less of the stock of X Corporation, and is employed by X as its presi-
dent. Both T and X are calendar year taxpayers. T's salary in 1979 is $30,000.
During 1979 T lends X $50,000 at ten percent interest. Because of a cash flow
problem, X neither pays salary to T nor interest on T's loan during 1979. As
an accrual basis taxpayer, X properly deducts on its 1979 return the salary and
interest owed T. As a cash basis taxpayer, T properly does not report any
salary or interest in his 1979 return. At the beginning of 1980, T forgives the
$50,000 loan and his $30,000 1979 salary in order to strengthen X's financial
position. X is solvent at all times. The issue is whether X has taxable conse-
quences as a result of T's forgiving the debts, especially in view of X's deduc-
tion of accrued interest and salary in the prior year.
First, section 267(a)(2) 125 would not apply. That section would per-
manently deny an accrual basis taxpayer any deduction for section 162 ex-
penses or for section 163 interest if(1) the expenses or interest are paid to a cash
basis taxpayer related to the accrual basis taxpayer, and (2) the expenses or in-
terest are not paid within two and a half months of the close of the taxable year
in which the expenses or interest are due. Under section 267 a shareholder is
not deemed "related" to a corporation unless he owns more than fifty percent
of the value of the corporation's stock.12 6
Two other general and somewhat overlapping principles may apply to T
and X's situation: (1) cancellation of indebtedness income and (2) the tax
benefit rule. The leading case involving cancellation of indebtedness income is
held that a subsidiary corporation does not recapture any income on the distribution of an expensed asset in
a 5 334(b)(1) liquidation. A recapture of income can only occur if the parent corporation subsequently
disposes of the expensed asset prior to the end of its useful life.
Likewise, there can be no recapture of any portion of an unused bad debt reserve in a 5 334(b)(1) liq-
uidation or corporate reorganization. § 381(c)(4) provides that in such transactions there shall be a car-
ryover of the transferor's accounting method to the acquiring corporation. Under Treas. Reg.
5 1.381(c)(4)-1(b)(1) Ex. 1 (1964), the carryover of an accounting method embraces the carryover of the
balance of a subsidiary's bad debt reserve. See also Home Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 514 F. 2d
1199, 1201 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1015 (1975); Calavo, Inc. v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 650, 652
(9th Cir. 1962); Citizens Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 290 F.2d 932, 937 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Home
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Cal. 1963); Argus, Inc. v. Commissioner, 45
T.C. 63, 66-67 (1965).
Such a result is consistent with the recapture rules of 5§ 1245 and 1250, which specifically exclude from
their coverage transactions in which the basis of the transferee is determined by reference to the basis of the
transferor and in which no gain is recognized to the transferor on the transaction. I.R.C. 5§ 1245(b)(3) and
1250(d)(3).
The tax benefit rule would apply to distributions in kind in liquidations which, like § 334(b)(2) liquida-
tions, entail a step-up in basis of the distributed asset to the distributee shareholder. These would embrace
complete liquidations under 5 331(a)(1) in which gain or loss is recognized by the distributee shareholder, as
when the shareholders are either individuals or a non-eighty percent corporation. They would also embrace
partial liquidations under 5 331(a)(2) where realized gain is always recognized by the distributee
shareholder whether an eighty percent subsidiary is involved or not. Set I.R.C. § 334(a); Rev. Rul. 74-396,
1974-2 C.B. 106, 107.
Presumably the rule would also apply to distributions in an elective, tax-free liquidation under § 333,
where the shareholder's basis in the distributed assets is, under 5 334(c), his basis in his stock with ad-
justments for gain recognized to the corporation and for money distributed. Rev. Rul. 74-396, 1974-2 C.B.
106, 107; O'Hare, supra note 91, at 203 (1976).
125 Section 267(a)(2) is derived from the Revenue Act of 1937, ch. 815, § 301(a), 50 Stat. 827.
126 I.R.C. § 267(a)(2)(b)(2).
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United States v. Kirby Lumber Co. 127 Kirby held that a corporation which repur-
chases its own bonds at a discount makes a "clear gain" by making available
assets previously offset by the obligation of the bonds, and therefore realizes a
taxable "accession to income.' '128 Kirby thus emphasizes the net increase in the
debtor's assets accruing from the cancellation of indebtedness. In the situation
of T and X, unless some exception applies, the Kirby approach would require X
to recognize income not only from the accrued interest and salary but also from
the principal of the loan indebtedness.
The tax benefit rule, on the other hand, takes a deduction approach to the
problem. If a debt had been previously deducted by the debtor, cancellation of
that debt amounts to a recovery and is includable in income to the extent the
prior deduction generated a tax benefit to the debtor. Under the tax benefit
rule X would be required to include in income the interest and salary, but not
the principal of the loan. 129
Two exclusionary rules come into play along with the two inclusionary
rules just discussed: the section 118 exclusion for contributions to capital and
the section 102 exclusion for gifts. 130 These exclusionary rules are among the
exceptions to the cancellation of indebtedness income principle. 131 The ques-
tion of principal concern is whether the tax benefit rule applies in the face of the
contribution to capital exclusionary rule. As previously discussed, the exclu-
sionary rules under sections 336 and 337 do not bar application of the tax
benefit rule in the corporate liquidation area. 32 If the tax benefit rule does not
apply in the contributions to capital area, the question of whether the
shareholder canceling the debt should be taxed under assignment of income
principles remains.
Recently in Putoma Corp. v. Commissioner, the Fifth Circuit held the tax
benefit rule inapplicable to shareholder forgiveness of interest indebtedness
previously deducted by the corporation. The decision was based upon the ex-
clusionary rules of sections 102 and 118. Before analyzing Putoma, it is
necessary to outline the peculiar historical developments that underlie the ma-
jority's opinion in that case. The key case is the 1943 Supreme Court decision
in Helvering v. American Dental Co. 133
A. Cases Prior to American Dental
In Commissioner v. Auto Strop Safety Razor Co., 134 a parent corporation had
127 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
128 Id. at 3.
129 See Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness and the Federal Income Tax: A Problem of Creeping Confusion, 14 TAx
L. REv. 225, 252-53 (1959); Warren and Sugarman, Cancellation of Indebtedness and Its Tax Consequences, 40
COLUM. L. REv. 1326, 1330-51 (1940).
130 Section 118 originated with adoption of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Pub. L. 591, 5 118, 68A
Stat. 39. Section 118 merely restated existing law as developed through administrative and court decisions.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4017,
4175.
131 Besides gifts and contributions to capital, the exceptions to cancellation of indebtedness income in-
clude insolvency, reduction of purchase price, and the special exclusionary rule in S 108. For recent outlines
of these exceptions, see Note, A Review ofJudicial Exceptions to the Kirby Lumber Rule, 30 U. FLA. L. Rev. 94
(1977); Bittker and Thompson, Income From the Discharge of Indebtedness: the Progeny of United States v. Kirby
Lumber Co., 66 CALIF. L. REv. 1159, 1174-87 (1978).
132 See text accompanying notes 5-22 supra.
133 318 U.S. 322 (1934).
134 74 F.2d 226 (2nd Cir. 1934), aff'g 28 B.T.A. 621 (1933).
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forgiven its one hundred percent subsidiary certain indebtedness consisting of
royalties, loans and interest. The forgiveness was intended to remove any hin-
drance to the subsidiary's operations and the marketing of its products. 135 The
court's analysis began with the last sentence in the regulation on cancellation of
indebtedness. For the taxable year in question the applicable regulation read as
follows:
The cancellation and forgiveness of indebtedness may amount to a payment of
income, to a gift, or to a capital transaction, dependent upon the cir-
cumstances. If, for example, an individual performs services for a creditor,
who in consideration thereof cancels the debt, income to that amount is real-
ized by the debtor as compensation for his services. If, however, a creditor
merely desires to benefit a debtor and without any consideration therefor
cancels the debt, the amount of the debt is a gift from the creditor to the debtor
and need not be included in the latter's gross income. If a shareholder in a cor-
poration which is indebted to him gratuitously forgives the debt, the transac-
tion amounts to a contribution to the capital of the corporation. 136
The court accepted the Board's finding that the forgiveness had been
gratuitous, and held that the cancellation was a contribution to capital ex-
cludable from income under the regulation.1 37
The government had argued that the debtor was on an accrual basis and
had deducted the amount of the debt in prior years, whereas the creditor was
on a cash basis and had not reported the amount as income. ' 3 8 The Second Cir-
cuit held that even if the claimed facts were before it, the result would not
change: "In doing what they did these two companies complied with the law.
... When the indebtedness was cancelled, whether or not it was a contribution
to the capital of the debtor depends upon considerations entirely foreign to the
question of the payment of income taxes in some previous year. 139
In 1940 the Eighth Circuit decided Helvering v. Jane Holding Corp. 140 In that
case a one hundred percent shareholder had placed all his stock in trust for the
benefit of his son and his son's family. The trustees then loaned money to the
corporation for construction of a building. Interest on the loan was accrued and
deducted on the corporation's tax returns, but was not included in the income
of the cash basis trustees. Subsequently, to eliminate legal obstacles to a divi-
dend distribution for the ultimate benefit of the trust beneficiaries, the trustees
canceled the corporation's indebtedness, including part of the principal and all
the accrued interest. The government sought to tax the corporation on the in-
terest that had been forgiven.141
The Board of Tax Appeals held against the government on the authority
of Auto Strop. 142 Four members dissented in separate opinions. One member
relied explicitly on the tax benefit rule.143 Another argued that the cancellation
135 28 B.T.A. at 621-22.
136 Treas. Reg. 69, art. 49 (issued pursuant to the Revenue Act of 1926).
137 318 U.S. 322.
138 74 F.2d at 227.
139 Id.
140 109 F.2d 933 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 653 (1940).
141 109 F.2d at 936.
142 38 B.T.A. 960, 970-71 (1938).
143 Id. at 976-78 (Hill, dissenting).
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of indebtedness regulation, the same version as was involved in Auto Strop, was
intended to deal with "principal indebtedness and not accrued
interest' " 4 4 -an intent indicated by the illustrations contained in the regula-
tion.
The Eighth Circuit reversed the Board of Tax Appeals, holding that the
corporation should be taxed because the forgiveness was not without considera-
tion. 145 The consideration was the corporation's release from its legal obliga-
tion to discharge its indebtedness and its ensuing freedom to make distributions
to the trust beneficiaries.1 46 It is difficult to see how any more consideration
flowed from the corporation in Jane Holding than in Auto Strop. Nevertheless, the
Eighth Circuit distinguished Auto Strop on the ground that in that case the
cancellation was gratuitous and its purpose was improvement of the corpora-
tion's capital structure.1 47
More importantly, the court expressed its agreement with the dissenter
below who argued that the cancellation of indebtedness regulation was not in-
tended to cover accrued interest since the regulation referred to
"indebtedness" and "debt. ' 14 The court also held the corporation taxable
under the tax benefit rule, 49 stating:
It is only the picture presented by the corporations bookkeeping system that is
unreal. That picturing of no income [by way of the deduction for accrued in-
terest], though not unlawful, turns out to be unreal. Brought to an end by the
forgiveness and cancellation of the interest debt in 1933, the real income was
then made apparent in the return for that year to the tax collector. 150
In the following year the Second Circuit again considered the issue in
Carroll-McCreary Co. v. Commissioner.'5' In that case shareholder-employees
forgave a corporation salary indebtedness which the corporation had accrued
and deducted in prior years. The shareholders, however, had reported their
salaries as income in the years in which the corporation had deducted them.
Although this did not cause the distortion that would have resulted if the
shareholders had not reported the salaries as income, the court merely men-
tioned this fact without comment.152
The Board of Tax Appeals had found the debt forgiveness non-gratuitous
because the shareholders had been benefited by furthering the life of the com-
pany. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that an indirect benefit always
results to shareholders who make a gift to the corporation. "Gratuitously
forgives" simply meant that the corporation paid no consideration for release
of the debt.' 53 The court rejected the Commissioner's argument that the
cancellation of indebtedness regulation, materially the same as that involved in
144 Id. at 975-76 (Sternhagen, dissenting).
145 109 F.2d at 937-38.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 942. See Warren and Sugarman, supra note 116, at 1360-61.
148 109 F.2d at 939.
149 Id. at 939-44.
150 Id. at 943.
151 124 F.2d 303 (2nd Cir. 1941).
152 Id. at 304.
153 Id. at 305.
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the preceding cases, 154 did not apply to debts deducted in prior years. Adhering
to its decision in Auto Strop, the court found nothing in the regulation's
language to support the Commissioner's limiting construction.15 5 The court
distinguished Jane Holding on the ground that the cancellation in that case was
not gratuitous. The court regarded further comments appearing in Jane Holding
as mere dicta with which it disagreed. 156
In several unreviewed decisions during 1940 and 1941, involving cancella-
tion of unpaid shareholder salaries deducted by corporations in prior years, the
Board of Tax Appeals agreed with Jane Holding and held the corporations tax-
able under the tax benefit rule.1 5 7 In one case the shareholder had reported the
salary as income. 158 This fact was not commented on by the Board and had no
bearing on its decision.
Thus, prior to the American Dental decision in 1943 there were two distinct
lines of authority on the question of contributions to capital and the tax benefit
rule: one headed by Auto Strop and Carroll-McCrea,, the other by Jane Holding.
One other noteworthy development was the 1938 amendment to the
contributions-to-capital language in the cancellation of indebtedness regula-
tion. 59 The sentence as amended read: "In general, if a shareholder in a cor-
poration which is indebted to him gratuitously forgives the debt, the transac-
tion amounts to a contribution to capital of the corporation to the extent of the
principal of the debt. [Italics indicate language added by amendment.]" This
identically worded sentence now appears in Regulation Section 1.61-12(a).
The amendment was not in issue in the above cases since they involved taxable
years prior to 1938.
B. The American Dental and George Hall Corp. Cases
Helvering v. American Dental Co., 160 decided by the United States Supreme
Court in 1943, involved a forgiveness of corporate indebtedness by outside
creditors rather than shareholders. The amounts owed were interest and rent
which the corporation had accrued and deducted in prior years.' 6' The Board
of Tax Appeals rejected the corporation's contention that the cancellation was
154 Treas. Reg. 86, art. 22(a)-14 (issued pursuant to the Revenue Act of 1934), quoted in 124 F.2d at 304
n. 1. Although there were a number of changes in this regulation, the sentence pertairiing to contributions to
capital remained the same. Id. at 305 n.1.
155 124 F.2d at 305.
156 Id.
157 Howard Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 545 (1941); Amsco-Wire Products Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 44 B.T.A. 717 (1941); Beacon Auto Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 703 (1940). In
Beacon Auto Stores, the Board also appeared to be of the opinion that under the facts the forgiveness did not
amount to a contribution to capital. 42 B.T.A. at 705.
158 Amsco-Wire Products Corp. v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 545 (1941). In Beacon Auto Stores v.
Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 703 (1940), the shareholders did not always report the unpaid salary. The Board
simply commented: "The petitioner fails to make anything of importance out of the inconsistency of the in-
dividuals in reporting or failing to report the full amount credited to them." 42 B.T.A. at 705.
In In re Triple Z Products, Inc., 27 A.F.T.R. 1164, 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), the district court followed
Auto Strop Safey Razor because it was the binding authority in its circuit. In Triple Z, the shareholders did
report as income the salaries deducted by the corporation. Nevertheless, this fact had no apparent bearing
on the court's decision.
159 Treas. Reg. 101, art. 22(a)-14 (issued pursuant to the Revenue Act of 1938). See Midland Tailors, 2
[1943] T.C.M. (CCH) 281, 284.
160 318 U.S. 322 (1943).




an excludable gift stating: "No evidence was introduced to show a donative in-
tent upon the part of any creditor. The evidence indicates, on the contrary,
that the creditors acted for purely business reasons and did not forgive the
debts for altruistic reasons or out of pure generosity."' 162 The Board held that
the cancellation was income under the tax benefit principle.'
63
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding the cancellation excludable as a gift
because it lacked consideration and inured solely to the corporation's
benefit. 16 The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit holding in these
words: "The fact that the motives leading to the cancellations were those of
business or even selfish, if it be true, is not significant. The forgiveness was
gratuitous, a release of something to the debtor for nothing, and sufficient to
make the cancellation here gifts within the statute." 1 65 The failure of the Court
to discuss the tax benefit rule and its focus on whether or not there was a gift
was probably due to the government's conceding that if the forgiveness were
truly a gift it would be excludable from income. 1 6
6
In passing, however, the Court did comment on contributions to capital:
"Where a stockholder gratuitously forgives the corporation's debt to himself,
the transaction has long been recognized by the Treasury as a contribution to
the capital of the corporation.' '167 The Court cited Auto Strop and the pre-1938
version of the cancellation of indebtedness regulation. Since the taxable year
involved in American Dental was 1937, the Court did not mention the 1938
amendment to the contributions-to-capital language in that regulation. 168
Later in 1943, the full Tax Court considered the impact of American Dental
on a situation involving the forgiveness of interest owed a shareholder-
debenture holder which was deducted by the corporation in prior years. In
George Hall Corp., 169 the shareholder had not included the interest in his income
during the prior years. The debt was canceled to strengthen the corporation's
financial position.
170
In an earlier, superseded Tax Court decision on the same case, the ma-
jority had held the cancellation of interest to be income to the corporation. The
short opinion' 7 1 made oblique references to Jane Holding and United States v. Kir-
by Lumber Co. 172 The four judge concurring opinion in the superseded decision
is of interest because of its reference to the 1938 amendment to the
162 44 B.T.A. 425, 428 (1941).
163 Id. at 428-29.
164 128 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1942).
165 318 U.S. at 331.
166 See summary of government's brief in Helvering v. American Dental Co., 87 L. Ed. 785, 786-87
(1943); Putoma Corp. v. Commissioner, 601 F.2d 734, 752 (5th Cir. 1979) (Rubin, J. dissenting);
American Dental Co. v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 254, 255 (7th Cir. 1942); Putoma Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 66 T.C. 652, 667 n.16 (1976).
167 318 U.S. at 328.
168 See text accompanying note 141 supra. The Court quoted the following language in the cancellation of
indebtedness regulation: "If, however, a creditor merely desires to benefit a debtor and without any con-
sideration therefor cancels the debt, the amount of the debt is a gift from the creditor to the debtor and need
not be included in the latter's gross income." Id. at 326.
This sentence, however, was deleted from the regulation in 1934, and was not in effect for the taxable
year in question, 1937. The 1932 and 1936 versions of the regulation are quoted in full by the court. Id. at
326-27 nn. 4 & 5.
169 2 T.C. 146 (1943).
170 This decision superseded an earlier opinion in the same case, also reviewed by the full court. 1 T.C.
471 (1943).
171 Id. at 472-73.
172 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
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contributions-to-capital language in the cancellation of indebtedness regula-
tion. 73 The concurring opinion regarded the amendment as "simply a
clarification of what had been the meaning of the language all along. 1 74
In the superseding decision, the majority held that American Dental re-
quired the conclusion that cancellation of the interest indebtedness was a non-
taxable gift despite the deduction of the indebtedness in earlier years. 75 The
majority considered irrelevant the fact that the regulation also called the trans-
action a contribution to capital.176 Two dissenting judges declared: "The deci-
sion here, I think, should follow that in Helvering v. Jane Holding Corp. The
holding of the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. American Dental Co. must be
'read in the context of its facts.' When so read it certainly is not to be construed
as reversing Helvering v. Jane Holding Corp. .... ",177
C. The Jacobson Case and Subsequent Contribution to Capital Cases
In 1949, the Supreme Court impliedly overruled its position in American
Dental as to the meaning of a gift. In Commissioner v. Jacobson, 178 an individual
taxpayer in straitened financial circumstances purchased at less than face value
negotiable bonds which he had originally issued at face value for cash. All the
sellers of the bonds knew the bonds were being purchased by or on behalf of the
maker. Unless the transaction was a gift, the difference between the face value
and the amount paid for repurchase would be income to the taxpayer under
United States v. Kirby Lumber Co. 179 The Supreme Court held that the transaction
was not a gift because there was no evidence the sellers were not acting in their
own interest by attempting to obtain the best available price for their claims. 18 0
The Court stated: "The situation in each transaction is a factual one. It turns
upon whether the transaction is in fact a transfer of something for the best price
available or is a transfer or release of only a part of a claim for cash and of the
balance 'for nothing.' "181
Because the Supreme Court reverted to a motive test inJacobson, American
Dental's meaning of gift was no longer viable.18 2 Nevertheless, American Dental
continued to be influential because it had found an excludable gift in a situa-
tion involving the forgiveness of interest and rent deducted by a taxpayer in
173 See text accompanying note 141 supra.
174 1 T.C. at 474. The pre-1938 version of the regulation was effective for the taxable years in question
in the case.
175 2 T.C. 146 (1943).
176 Id. at 147.
177 Id. (citations omitted). For holdings in 1943 and 1944 similar to the superseding decision in George
Hall Corp., see Pondfield Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 1943 FED. TAXES (P-H) 61,103 (2d Cir. 1943), rev'g
without opinion 1 T.C. 217 (1942); Pancoast Hotel Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 362 (1943); McConway &
Torley Corp. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 593 (1943); S. H. DeRoy & Co., [1944] T.C.M. (P-H) 44,154;
Brown Cab Co., [1943] T.C.M. (P-H) 43,262, superseding [1943] T.C.M. (P-H) 43,033; Midland
Tailors, [1943] T.C.M. (P-H) 43,292; Tanner Manufacturing Co., [1943] T.C.M. (P-H) 43,299.
178 336 U.S. 28 (1949).
179 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
180 336 U.S. at 50-52.
181 Id. at 51. The Supreme Court distinguished American Dental by stating that a gift was more likely to
occur in connection with a release of an open account for rent or for interest than with a sale of outstanding
securities. Id. See the later Supreme Court decision of Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960),
where the Court further elaborated on the necessity of donative intent in a gift transaction.
182 See Eustice, supra note 129, at 248-50; Bittker and Thompson, supra note 131, at 1178.
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prior years. Thus, in Reynolds v. Boos 83 an individual taxpayer was forgiven un-
paid rent which he had accrued and deducted in prior years. After affirming
the district court's finding of a gift, 84 the Eighth Circuit rejected the govern-
ment's contention that, gift or no gift, the cancellation of rent was includable
under the tax benefit rule. 18 5 The court pointed out that although the taxpayers
in American Dental had received prior tax benefits, the Supreme Court had
found an excludable gift. 86
In Utilities & Industries Corp., 187 a corporate shareholder had canceled un-
paid interest on a loan to the corporation's subsidiary. The subsidiary had ac-
crued and deducted this interest in prior years, but the parent had also includ-
ed the interest in those years as an accrual basis taxpayer. The cancellation had
occurred when the corporation was undergoing a bankruptcy reorganization.
In an unreviewed decision, the Tax Court held that the cancellation was an ex-
cludable contribution to capital. 188 The court stated that this exclusion had
been held applicable both to principal and accrued interest regardless of prior
years' tax treatment of such interest, citing Auto Strop and other cases. The Tax
Court also held the cancellation excludable under the exception in the regula-
tions for bankruptcy reorganizations. 189
In Commissioner v. Fender Sales, 190 the Ninth Circuit considered a situation
in which both fifty percent shareholders had canceled unpaid salaries owed
them by the corporation in order to facilitate a bank loan. The corporation had
deducted these salaries in prior years and the shareholders had not included
them in income. In addition, the corporation had issued the two shareholders
equal additional shares of common stock in return for the cancellation. Thus,
after the transaction each shareholder continued to own fifty percent of the cor-
poration's common stock.
The Ninth Circuit focused on the potential tax liability of the shareholders
arising from their receipt of the stock. The court held the stock's fair market
value taxable to the shareholders since the stock had been issued in discharge of
the corporation's salary obligations to them.' 9' The court considered im-
material the fact that the shareholders' percentage interest in the corporation
had remained unchanged. As would not be the case in a pro rata stock dividend,
the corporation was substantially different after the transaction, since its net
worth increased due to the cancellation of the salaries. This increase in the cor-
poration's net worth substantially enhanced the value of the stockholders'
holdings in the corporation. 92
183 188 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1951), aff'g 84 F. Supp. 185 (D. Minn. 1949).
184 The aberrational quality of this case on the gift question was noted in Bradford v. Commissioner,
233 F.2d 935, 937 (6th Cir. 1956).
185 188 F.2d at 325-26.
186 Id. at 326. The district court similarly rejected the government's argument. 84 F. Supp. at 188-89.
Note that the Eighth Circuit decided the 1940 case of Jane Holding Corp.
187 41 T.C. 888 (1964), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. South Bay Corp. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 698
(2d Cir. 1965).
188 41 T.C. at 910.
189 Id. The applicable regulation was Treas. Reg. 111 5 29.22(a)-13(b)(1) (1944), now Treas. Reg.
1.61-12(b)(1) (1960). The regulation expresses the insolvency exception to cancellation of indebtedness in-
come.
190 338 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1965), rev'g inpart [1963] T.C.M. (P-H) 63,119, cert. denid, 381 U.S. 935,
382 U.S. 813 (1965) (separate denials for consolidated cases).
191 Id. at 927.
192 Id.
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The Fender Sales court relied on Helvering v. Horst, 193 in which the Supreme
Court held that income received on payment of interest from coupon bonds
and given by a father to his son as a gift was taxable to the father. 194 The Ninth
Circuit stated:
Randall and Fender, when they voluntarily elected to exercise their dominion
and control over the choses in action against Fender Sales, Inc. for unpaid
salaries by extinguishing them for the benefit of the corporation, of which they
were sole owners, thereby augmenting the intrinsic worth of the capital stock
they held, more surely "realized" for their own benefit the value of the obliga-
tions discharged than did Horst in his gift of interest coupons to his son. 95
Finally, the court summarily rejected the government's alternative argu-
ment that the corporation rather than the shareholders should be taxed. 1 96 The
court found the transaction to be either a payment for stock, excludable under
section 1032, or a contribution to capital, excludable under section 118. The
court cited as authority Carroll-McCreary, Auto Strop and American Dental.
Judge Barnes dissented solely on the question of the taxability of the
shareholders. 197 According to the judge, this was the first case he had en-
countered in which shareholders had been found to have realized income on an
increase in corporate net worth where neither a dividend had been declared nor
a capital gain realized by the shareholders. 198 The judge likened the Fender Sales
facts to a situation in which shareholders initially forgo taking a salary for ser-
vices to the corporation. 199 In such an event the shareholders would not be cur-
rently taxed, but would simply have enhanced the value of their investment in
the corporation. This enhancement would be taxed at a capital gain rate when
the stockholders later disposed of their stock.200
Finally, in Hartland Associates, 201 a one hundred percent shareholder had
purchased certain promissory notes with accrued interest outstanding against
his corporation. The corporation had deducted the interest in prior years but it
is unclear whether the prior noteholders included the interest in income. The
shareholder canceled the corporation's accrued interest to improve the cor-
poration's deteriorating financial condition. In an unreviewed decision, the
Tax Court held the cancellation to be a gratuitous contribution to capital, ex-
cludable from the corporation's income. Citing Auto Strop and American Dental,
193 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
194 338 F.2d at 928-29.
195 Id. at 929.
196 Id. at 930. The Service expressed agreement with Fender Sales on the issue of the taxability of the
shareholders in Rev. Rul. 67-402, 1967-2 C.B. 135. For cases to the contrary, see joy Mfg. v. Commis-
sioner, 230 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1956); Delos E. Daggitt v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 31 (1954).
197 338 F. 2d at 930 (Barnes, J. dissenting in part and concurring in part).
198 Id.
199 Id. at 931. Judge Barnes concurred on the question of the taxability of the corporation. While
recognizing that American Dental did not precisely govern the situation involved in Fender Sales, Judge Barnes
noted that the trend after American Dental was to follow Carroll-McCreary and not Jane Holding. The latter cases
had held that the prior deduction of a debt was immaterial as to whether a nontaxable contribution to capital
was effected by the debt cancellation. Id. at 933.
200 Id. at 931.
201 54 T.C. 1580 (1970).
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the court stated that the corporation's deduction of the interest in prior years
was immaterial. 20 2
D. The Putoma Case
In Putoma Corp. v. Commissioner, 203 a fifty percent shareholder in two cor-
porations forgave interest owed him by the corporation in order to improve the
corporation's financial condition in the eyes of creditors and potential lenders.
The corporation had accrued and deducted the unpaid interest, but as a cash
basis taxpayer, the shareholder had not included the interest in the income.
In a reviewed decision, the Tax Court rejected the Commissioner's argu-
ment that the transaction resulted in income to the corporation. 20 4 The court
noted that the problem presented by the facts arose from the convergence of a
rule of income exclusion (gratuitous contributions to capital) and two rules of
income inclusion (cancellation of indebtedness income and the tax benefit
rule). The contribution to capital exclusionary rule clearly overrides the
cancellation of indebtedness income principal when a shareholder gratuitously
forgives a debt owed him by his corporation. It does not follow, however, that
when the canceled indebtedness consists of interest accrued and deducted by
the corporation the tax benefit rule should automatically disappear with the
cancellation of indebtedness income principle. The majority stated that the two
inclusionary rules in fact vanished together "[d]ue more to history than
logic. "205 Prior to American Dental the Commissioner had argued, with mixed
results, 20 6 that the contribution to capital expulsion did not extend to the
cancellation of previously deducted items resulting in a tax benefit. American
Dental proved a "mortal blow" to the Commissioner's theory, however. 20 7
American Dental was relied on in a series of cases holding that the cancellation of
accrued and deducted items does not produce income to the debtor if the
cancellation is a contribution to capital. The Tax Court concluded that
"[w]hile a theoretically correct statement might indeed have merit considered
de novo, we hardly write on a clean slate." '20 8
The Tax Court also rejected the Commissioner's alternative argument,
based on Fender Sales20 9 and Helvering v. Horst, that the shareholder should be
taxed on the cancellation. Fender Sales was distinguished because stock was
received in that case in consideration of the cancellation. 21 0 Because the finan-
cial problems of Putoma made collectability of the interest obligation doubtful,
202 Id. at 1586. Another issue in the case involved the application of § 267(a)(2) to certain rental ex-
penses. Id. at 1587-90.
See also Greer v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1956), rev'g Brazoria Inv. Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 20 T.C. 690 (1953); Leo Perlman v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 755, 757 (1957), aff'd, 252 F.2d 890 (2d
Cir. 1958); Rev. Rul. 76-316, 1976-2 C.B. 22.
203 601 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'g 66 T.C. 652 (1976).
204 66 T.C. at 663-68.
205 Id. at 663, 666.
206 Id. at 666.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 668. In a footnote, the majority noted the anomaly inherent in the Commissioner's regulations
and rulings holding that the insolvency exception to cancellation of indebtedness income applied even when
the debtor has received a tax benefit through the deduction of the cancelled indebtedness. Id. at 668 n.20. See
also Eustice, supra note 129, at 253.
209 Discussed in text accompanying notes 173-77 supra.
210 66 T.C. at 669.
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the Tax Court was unable to find that the shareholder exercised a power to
dispose of income equivalent to realization . 2 1 The court stated:
As a practical matter, the options open to petitioners did not really include a
power of disposal, but were limited to relinquishment or maintaining the
status quo. Any 'dominion and control' was of a very tenuous nature, and ex-
ercisable only within this narrow corridor. The course of action followed arose
from and was circumscribed by the existing exigencies, and we decline to
equate this 'dominion and control' with the assignment of a receivable by an
individual either to secure a reciprocal advantage-discharge of a debt, the
supply of goods, the rendering of services, etc.-or to make a gift. 212
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court, 213 holding that the corporation
had no income despite its receiving a tax benefit through a deduction for the
cancelled interest indebtedness. Oddly, the court held that the transaction was
excludable not only as a contribution to capital under section 118 but also as a
gift under section 102.214 The court appears to have been wrong in this regard:
a transaction cannot be both a contribution to capital and a gift. A contribution
to capital involves an intent to enhance the value of one's own stock invest-
ment. A gift involves donative intent, such as would exist where the dominant
motive of a contribution to the capital of a family corporation is to benefit
shareholder-relatives.215
The three judge dissent in the Tax Court stressed the overriding account-
ing role of the tax benefit rule, pointing to the cases holding the rule applicable
in the face of section 337's.exclusionary rule.2 6 In his dissent from the Fifth
Circuit's majority opinion, Judge Rubin observed that the 1938 amendment to
the cancellation of indebtedness regulation made clear that the contribution to
capital exclusion did not extend to the interest portion of a canceled corporate
debt to the extent of a prior tax benefit to the corporation. 2 7 The amendment
had little influence on the course ofjudicial decision because the American Dental
case appeared to be contrary precedent. 2 8 However, not only did American Den-
tal concern gifts rather than contributions to capital, but the Commissioner had
also conceded in that case that the cancellation would be excludable from cor-
porate income if it were a gift. Judge Rubin agreed that gifts to corporations
were nontaxable under section 102 to the full extent of principal and interest,
and that the regulations defining a "gift" did not compel a different conclu-
211 66 T.C. at 670.
212 Id. The majority opinion noted that, under the logic of the government's theory, in cancelling in-
terest indebtedness a creditor would recognize income even if the debtor as a cash basis taxpayer had not
deducted the interest. Id. at 671, n.29.
213 601 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1979).
214 Id. at 742, 751.
215 See Pennsylvania Electric Co. v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 416, 418 (Ct. Cl. 1955); Behrsin, 4that
Constitutes Contribution to Capital Is Still Unclear-Can It Be Treated as a Gifti, 44J. TAX. 270, 274-75 (1976);
Landis, Contributions to Capital of Corporations, 24 TAX L. REv. 241, 246 (1969); Warren and Sugarman, supra
note 129, at 1366-67; Comment, 14 GA. L. REv. 126, 132-33 (1979).
In the Tax Court, the Commissioner apparently abandoned his alternative argument that the
shareholder should be taxed under Fender Sales.
216 66 T.C. at 675-78.
217 601 F.2d at 752-54. See text accompanying note 159 supra.




sion. 21 9 Putoma involved not a gift but a contribution to capital and, under the
regulations, the exclusion for contributions to capital extends to cancellation
only of the principal of a debt. 220
E. Analysis of Putoma
Putoma presented a classic case for application of the tax benefit rule. A
corporation deducted unpaid but accrued interest on a debt owed a shareholder
and thereby achieved a reduction in its taxes. The shareholder did not include
the interest in income. He subsequently released the corporation from its
liability for the accrued interest, increasing the corporation's net worth to the
extent of the liability. This constitutes a "recovery" of the deduction in a very
common form. 221
If the shareholder had included the interest in income at some point (for
example, at the time it was due under accrual basis accounting), the tax benefit
rule should not apply. The inclusion would be essentially the same as if the cor-
poration had actually paid the interest and the shareholder had then con-
tributed the interest proceeds to the corporation's capital, a clearly excludable
transaction under section 118.222
The nonrecognition rule of section 118 should no more bar application of
the tax benefit rule than should the nonrecognition rules of sections 336 and
337.223 The tax benefit rule is an overriding accounting principle which
prevents the distortion resulting from a taxpayers' taking a deduction which, in
the light of subsequent events, turns out to have been unwarranted.
The tax benefit rule was rejected in Putoma not on its merits but because of
history. The key obstacle to application of the rule was the American Dental deci-
sion. Although the Fifth Circuit dissent in Putoma distinguished American Dental
in part because it involved a gift rather than a contribution to capital, 224 it is
difficult to perceive why the rule should apply in one case and not the other.
The important fact about American Dental is that the Supreme Court concerned
itself solely with whether there was a gift (as determined under guidelines later
overturned in Jacobson)225 and did not deal with the applicability of the tax
benefit rule. This likely resulted from the government's concession that if the
transaction were truly a gift it would be excludable from income. 226 There is
strong case precedent in Jane Holding227 (as well as a long standing regula-
tion 228) favoring application of the tax benefit rule. That precedent should not
be nullified by misapprehensions about the impact of American Dental. As the
219 601 F.2d at 753. Judge Simpson's dissenting opinion in the Tax Court appears to be to the contrary
on this point. 66 T.C. at 677-78.
220 601 F.2d at 753-54. The Tax Court decision in Putoma Corp. was followed in Dwyer v. United States,
439 F. Supp. 99 (D. Or. 1977).
221 See note 94 supra and accompanying text.
222 O'Hare, supra note 123, at 243. However, Rev. Rul. 76-316, 1976-2 C.B. 22, is to the contrary.
223 See text accompanying note 121 supra.
224 See text accompanying note 219 supra.
225 See text accompanying notes 178-86 supra.
226 See text accompanying note 166 supra.
227 Discussed in text accompanying notes 140-50 supra. The 1951 decision of the Eighth Circuit in
Reynolds v. Boos, discussed in text accompanying notes 166-68 supra, tends to contradict Jane Holding.
However, Reynolds v. Boos was a gift situation, and no mention was made of Jane Holding.
228 See text accompanying note 159 supra.
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Putoma Tax Court dissent stated, an attempt should be made "to clarify this
area of the law and not add to its confusion .... ,229
It is possible to tax shareholders under the Helvering v. Horst principle230 in
lieu of taxing the corporation under the tax benefit rule. In theory, by electing
to cancel interest or salary indebtedness to strengthen his company's financial
condition, a shareholder has exercised sufficient dominion over the interest or
salary to have realized income for tax purposes. This approach was embraced
by the Ninth Circuit in Fender Sales23 1 and was rejected, at least under the facts
of the case, by the Tax Court in Putoma.232 It is open to serious question
whether the Helvering v. Horst principle can encompass such a shareholder
transaction. In essence, what the shareholder has done is convert a creditor's
claim (which may be of tenuous value against a financially straitened corpora-
tion) into a capital interest. Income will not be realized from this capital in-
terest until the interest is sold or the corporation pays a dividend. 233 A situation
involving such a contribution to the corporation's capital is equivalent to the
situation in which the shareholder grants the corporation an interest-free loan
or forgoes drawing a salary because the shareholder would presently realize no
income under either circumstance.
It would seem preferable to use the tax benefit rule to tax the corporation
on the prior deduction of interest or salary which the corporation subsequently
does not have to pay. In that way, the corporation's tax liability will be
equivalent to what it would have been had no salary or interest obligation been
established initially. 234  IV. Conclusion
Given the overriding accounting role of the tax benefit rule, the Tennessee-
Carolina Transportation case correctly applied the rule to liquidating distributions
of expensed assets. An "inconsistent event" analysis would seem to be the best
rationale for this application of the doctrine. On the other hand, the failure of
Putoma to apply the tax benefit rule to contributions to capital by way of
forgiveness of interest and expense indebtedness compares unfavorably with
the properly expansive application of the rule in the corporate liquidation area.
The basis for refusing to apply the rule in the contribution to capital area is an
unwarranted reliance on American Dental. Taxation of the corporation under the
tax benefit rule would seem a better approach to rectifying such income distor-
tion than taxing the shareholder under assignment of income principles. To tax
neither the shareholder nor the corporation leads to a totally unwarranted tax
windfall.
229 66 T.C. at 679.
230 See text accompanying notes 193-95 supra.
231 Discussed in text accompanying notes 191-196 supra. Fender Sales involved a cancellation of salary in-
debtedness in return for a pro rata issuance of stock. The approach taken in the case would also logically ap-
ply to a contribution to capital situation.
232 Discussed in text accompanying notes 209-12 supra
233 See Comment, 17 HASTINOs L.J. 784, 789-90 (1966).
234 For commentaries in favor of the application of the tax benefit rule, see Surrey, The Revenue Act of
1939 and the Income Tax Treatment of Cancellation of Indebtedness, 49 YALE L.J. 1153, 1176-77 (1940); Warren
and Sugarman, supra note 129 at 1348-49, 1358-59; Comment, 17 HASTINos L.J. 784, 788-91 (1966); Com-
ment, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 833, 847-55 (1966); Comment, 32 U. MIAMI L. REv. 487 (1977). One com-
mentator suggests a possible 5 482 approach to the problem. Note, 30 FLA. L. REV. 94, 106-07 (1977).
One recent commentary argues in favor of taxing the shareholder under a constructive receipt of in-
come theory and argues against the taxation of the corporation under the tax benefit rule. Bittker and
Thompson, supra note 131, at 1179-82.
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